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BIG DATA AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Peter N. Salib
ABSTRACT—As a vast and ever-growing body of social-scientific research
shows, discrimination remains pervasive in the United States. In education,
work, consumer markets, healthcare, criminal justice, and more, Black
people fare worse than whites, women worse than men, and so on. Moreover,
the evidence now convincingly demonstrates that this inequality is driven by
discrimination. Yet solutions are scarce. The best empirical studies find that
popular interventions—like diversity seminars and antibias trainings—have
little or no effect. And more muscular solutions—like hiring quotas or school
busing—are now regularly struck down as illegal. Indeed, in the last thirty
years, the Supreme Court has invalidated every such ambitious affirmative
action plan that it has reviewed.
This Article proposes a novel solution: Big Data Affirmative Action.
Like old-fashioned affirmative action, Big Data Affirmative Action would
award benefits to individuals because of their membership in protected
groups. Since Black defendants are discriminatorily incarcerated for longer
than whites, Big Data Affirmative Action would intervene to reduce their
sentences. Since women are paid less than men, it would step in to raise their
salaries. But unlike old-fashioned affirmative action, Big Data Affirmative
Action would be automated, algorithmic, and precise. Circa 2021, data
scientists are already analyzing rich datasets to identify and quantify
discriminatory harm. Armed with such quantitative measures, Big Data
Affirmative Action algorithms would intervene to automatically
adjust flawed human decisions—correcting discriminatory harm but going
no further.
Big Data Affirmative Action has two advantages over the alternatives.
First, it would actually work. Unlike, say, antibias trainings, Big Data
Affirmative Action would operate directly on unfair outcomes, immediately
remedying discriminatory harm. Second, Big Data Affirmative Action
would be legal, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent case law. As
argued here, the Court has not, in fact, recently turned against affirmative
action. Rather, it has consistently demanded that affirmative action policies
both stand on solid empirical ground and be well tailored to remedying only
particularized instances of actual discrimination. The policies that the Court
recently rejected have failed to do either. Big Data Affirmative Action can
easily do both.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the successes of the Civil Rights Era in rolling back overtly
racist laws, and despite Americans’ declining willingness to openly espouse
racist views,1 racial inequality continues to pervade nearly every institution
of American life. People of color are arrested and convicted of crimes at
higher rates than their white counterparts. Once convicted, they are
sentenced to harsher punishment. Educational attainment for nonwhite
Americans lags that of white Americans. Statistics are similarly grim for
everything from hiring and compensation to healthcare and mortality.2 And

1

There are, of course, notable exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Rally by White
Nationalists Was Over Almost Before It Began, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018, 3:30 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/us/politics/charlottesville-va-protest-unite-the-right.html
[https://perma.cc/P3SN-XV7R] (discussing the alt-right movement and white supremacist rallies).
2 For a discussion of the vast literature on persistent discrimination across these domains, see infra
Section I.A.
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as artificially intelligent decision-making becomes ascendant, algorithms
threaten to replicate and entrench these unequal outcomes permanently.
Solutions are elusive. Empirical studies of popular interventions—like
diversity trainings and de-biasing seminars—show that they have little realworld effect. On the other hand, aggressive proposals—like racial hiring
quotas—are now regularly struck down by the Supreme Court.
This Article proposes a new paradigm for redressing unfair racial
disparities wherever they persist: “Big Data Affirmative Action.” The core
idea is simple. Under Big Data Affirmative Action policies, members of
racial minority or other disadvantaged3 groups would receive lighter
sentences, higher pay, better healthcare, and more. They would receive all
of this because of their race—offsetting discrimination they would likewise
face because of race.
But unlike old-fashioned affirmative action plans, Big Data Affirmative
Action policies would be carefully calibrated to remedy the exact harm
caused by the institutions implementing them. Relying on technologically
sophisticated, quantitatively precise empirical foundations, they would
distribute benefits large enough to redress measured discrimination, but no
larger. In other words, under each policy, the remedy would match the harm.
Such careful calibration would allow Big Data Affirmative Action to
overcome the legal shortcomings that have recently hamstrung traditional
affirmative action interventions like hiring quotas.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I first canvasses the socialscientific evidence on persistent racial inequality. It shows that such
inequality continues to plague essentially every important institution of
American life. And it argues that recent research clearly demonstrates that
discrimination—not other factors—causes this inequality. The Part then
examines popular proposed remedies for discriminatory inequality, like debiasing trainings. It argues that, as far as the best empirical research can
show, such strategies are exceedingly unlikely to deliver meaningful results.
Part II then introduces a first-of-its-kind solution: Big Data Affirmative
Action. Imagine, for example, a Black job applicant has just been hired at a
company with a Big Data Affirmative Action policy for compensation. She
and her new employer negotiate a starting salary, which is entered into the
company’s HR system. Then an algorithm intervenes, increasing the
3 This Article generally uses racial discrimination as its core example. This is in part for simplicity’s
sake and in part because racial discrimination is particularly pervasive. But the ideas and policies
discussed here can easily be applied to combat other kinds of discrimination—based on gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, religion, and more. In addition, where other varieties of discrimination present
particular puzzles, these are discussed explicitly. See, e.g., infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text
(discussing sex discrimination in criminal sentencing).
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applicant’s pay by precisely the amount the employer likely penalized her
because of her race. Or picture instead a Latino defendant who has just been
convicted of a crime in a judicial district with Big Data Affirmative Action
sentencing. He appears at his sentencing hearing, and the judge hands down
a term of imprisonment. Here again, an algorithm steps in. Armed with
information about the amount of additional incarceration he incurred because
of racial bias in the courthouse, the algorithm reduces his sentence by exactly
that amount.
Big Data Affirmative Action has become practicable only recently. As
Part II explains, circa 2021, essentially every human decision leaves—or
could leave—a data trail. As a result, policymakers can now assemble rich
datasets about the multitude of factors influencing decisions ranging from
employee hiring to disease diagnosis to criminal sentencing. Such data,
paired with sophisticated statistical analysis, can—and indeed, already
does—supply new, precise measures of racial discrimination across
numerous domains.
In our era of rich, ubiquitous information, the potential for Big Data
Affirmative Action is essentially unbounded. Big Data Affirmative Action
policies need not be limited to employment or criminal sentencing. They
could be implemented wherever people continue to suffer harm from racial
bias, so long as sufficient data could be collected to estimate the quantum of
that harm. And in our increasingly data-drenched world, that stands to be just
about everywhere. In fact, Big Data Affirmative Action could even be
applied to algorithms’ decisions, addressing widespread concerns about
algorithmic bias.
Part III turns to Big Data Affirmative Action’s legality. Various
constitutional and statutory provisions forbid discrimination on the basis of
race. And for better or worse, the Supreme Court presently interprets those
laws to limit both race-based inflictions of harm and race-based grants of
benefit.4 This gives rise to the facially puzzling fact that many policies
designed to help disadvantaged groups overcome discrimination can
themselves constitute illegal discrimination.
This puzzle is not a new one. Indeed, only half of the Big Data
Affirmative Action proposal—the “Big Data” half—is novel. Affirmative
action, by contrast, has been the subject of intense legal controversy for over
half a century.
Colleges, of course, practice a variety of affirmative action, which has
been the subject of particularly heated disagreement in recent years. But
campus affirmative action is somewhat idiosyncratic—a minor subgenre of
4
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a formerly grand medium. Today, race is regularly considered in college
admissions, but only for the purpose of improving on-campus “diversity”—
not redressing discrimination—and never as a decisive factor. This is
comparatively weak stuff, not much resembling the Big Data proposal. And
at any rate, the Supreme Court has long foreshadowed the demise of
diversity-based affirmative action.5 It may be poised to deliver on that
prediction this Term.6
History, however, presents another, more robust species of affirmative
action, from which Big Data Affirmative Action more directly descends. In
the mid-twentieth century, school busing plans, racial hiring quotas, and setasides in government spending for minority-owned business all sought to
directly redress discriminatory harm.7 And to achieve that goal, those
policies used race as the decisive factor for allocating benefits.
This more muscular variety of affirmative action is widely believed to
be either dead or on life support. In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court
has struck down every policy of this type that it has reviewed. As a result of
those decisions, academics, judges, and lawmakers have repeatedly
questioned the continuing legal viability of such affirmative action plans.8
Policymakers have thus turned away from affirmative action toward
other interventions that are both less legally fraught and, unfortunately,
less effective.
Part III goes on to contend that the muscular variety of affirmative
action is not dead—only resting. Taking the Supreme Court at its word, the
Part argues that this style of affirmative action plan remains legally
permissible. But to be permitted, the Court has consistently held, such
policies must be empirically sound and carefully designed. As the Court now
puts it, affirmative action policies must respond to a “strong basis in
evidence” of redressable discrimination.9 Part III shows that, when the Court
has recently struck down such plans, the reason has been because they failed
to clear the required legal hurdle. Big Data Affirmative Action, by contrast,
would leap the hurdle easily.

5

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 142 S. Ct. 895
(2022) (asking the Court to reject diversity-justified affirmative action in college admissions); infra
Section III.A.1 (explaining the difference between diversity-justified and discrimination-remediating
affirmative action).
7 See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing); Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (hiring quotas); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(government spending).
8 See infra notes 108–110.
9 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
6
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What exactly is the strong basis in evidence standard, and why would
Big Data Affirmative Action satisfy it? The rule has two elements. First, it
imposes a burden of proof for showing that actual discrimination is
occurring. Crucially, the evinced discrimination must be localized to the
institution promulgating the affirmative action policy. An employer, for
example, may not attempt to undo discrimination in the education system,
nor may educators undo it in the housing system. Each institution may, so to
speak, clean only its own house. Second, the rule requires that affirmative
action policies be tailored to address only the documented discrimination
caused by the promulgating institution—but go no further.
These legal constraints mean each individual affirmative action policy
must be careful, imposing modest race-based benefits that will generally fall
short of gross racial disparities. For example, a racial hiring gap at a company
may be caused in part by the company’s own bias against well-qualified
Black and Brown candidates. A well-tailored affirmative action policy
implemented by the company may redress that quantum of discrimination.
But some of the gap may be caused by upstream differences in applicants’
attainment of necessary credentials. Even if those differences, too, were
caused by discrimination—say, in college admissions—the employer must
take them as given. As the strong basis in evidence standard is understood
today, an employer’s policy that corrects a college’s discrimination will be
struck down.
Part III then shows why Big Data Affirmative Action policies, if
properly designed, would satisfy both elements of the strong basis in
evidence standard. Already, careful social scientists are conducting studies
that show, with high certainty, how racial bias influences decisions in
particular institutions—businesses, industries, schools, courts, and more.
These studies show not only that racial bias has some effect, but how much.
They also isolate the sources of discrimination, disentangling the harm
attributable to the institution under review from that attributable to other
institutions. Big Data Affirmative Action policies would be based on
empirical analyses of exactly this kind. They would thus impose race-based
adjustments at a particular locus of discrimination, carefully sized to the
quantum of discrimination imposed at that locus. As a result—Part III
shows—Big Data Affirmative Action’s basis in evidence would be even
stronger than that of the policies that the Supreme Court has approved.
Part IV turns to normative objections. It begins with the conservative
critiques of affirmative action that characterize it as a kind of “reverse
racism.” These critiques take at least three forms. One version contends that
affirmative action actually harms, not helps, people of color by signaling that
they did not earn and do not deserve their achievements. Another version
826
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focuses on the individuals who do not benefit from a given affirmative action
policy. Here, the argument goes, any race-based benefit to one group
inevitably implies an unjust race-based deprivation to another. A third
variation takes a more philosophical view, arguing that any policy that treats
people differently because of their race is wrong, no matter the
consequences.
Part IV argues that these critiques have force—if at all—only against
old-fashioned, less carefully calibrated forms of affirmative action. Big Data
Affirmative Action policies grant precise race-based benefits that remedy
what would otherwise be discriminatory harms. They go no further. Thus,
beneficiaries do not receive anything undeserved. On the contrary, Big Data
Affirmative Action ensures that everyone receives what they do deserve—
and would have gotten absent discrimination. Likewise, there is no injustice
in depriving one group of a benefit secured only via discrimination against
another group. Finally, race-based preferences simply are not wrong when
they are remedies for race-based discrimination. That is just how remedies
work. They flow to the injured.
Part IV addresses other normative questions, too: Are Big Data
Affirmative Action remedies sufficiently individualized? Are modern socialscientific measures of discrimination trustworthy enough to base important
policies on? Is Big Data Affirmative Action a potent enough intervention to
radically reduce racial inequality? Would Big Data Affirmative Action be
robust to the dynamic human responses that might follow from its
implementation? Should humans continue to have any involvement in the
making of important, and potentially discriminatory, decisions? Ought we be
comfortable with a policy intervention that essentially abandons any hope
that humans can change for the better, to be less biased? This Part argues that
the answer to all of these questions is “yes.”
I.

PERSISTENT DISCRIMINATION AND FAILED INTERVENTIONS

Why do we need Big Data Affirmative Action? Perhaps, one imagines,
the worst of America’s racial strife is behind us. And surely whatever
discriminatory attitudes remain are soon to be eliminated as antiracism
pledges, antibias training, and similar interventions become widespread.
Maybe progress is on the march, and the best thing to do is to double down
on the strategies that are already spurring it forward.
This Part argues that such optimism, if well-meaning, is deeply
misinformed on at least two counts. First, while it is true that the United
States’ gravest racial sins—slavery, mass lynchings, Jim Crow—are in the
past, inequality persists. In essentially every imaginable domain of life—
employment, education, healthcare, criminal justice—Black and brown
827
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Americans suffer worse outcomes than their white peers. And the evidence
now shows convincingly that the best explanation for these persistent
disparities is widespread discrimination—not other more benign factors.
Second, modern discrimination is stubborn. Antibias trainings and
diversity seminars are beginning to pervade public and private institutions.
Corporations, universities, and governments profess commitments to
antiracism. Yet the best empirical evidence now shows that the leading
interventions designed to reduce racism and eliminate inequality in fact have
no effect at all. Bolder strategies are needed.
A. The Science Is Clear: Discrimination Is Everywhere
American society remains deeply unequal. Worse, the lion’s share of
disadvantage continues to fall on Americans who, for generations, were
disenfranchised, subjugated, dehumanized, and exploited. A vast social
science literature investigates this relationship between historical and
present-day disadvantage. It catalogues the substantial, measurable
disparities that persist today. And crucially, convincing evidence now shows
that these disparities are not due to “legitimate” differences between
members of different groups. Instead, their cause is discrimination.
Social science skeptics may doubt this claim—or at least its certainty.
After all, the world is a messy place, and causal inference is hard. One might
readily accept that there are racial, gendered, and other disparities in our
society but doubt we have proof that discrimination causes them.
Yet the social-scientific evidence on discrimination is about as rocksolid as it gets. For roughly the past twenty years, economists have been
performing randomized experiments that document discrimination across
social domains.10 This style of study design represents the gold standard for
causal inference. Bolstering the large and growing body of randomized
experimental evidence, innumerable statistical studies using real-world data
likewise reveal discrimination. The best of these statistical studies minimize
the risk of confounding causes by assembling unusually rich datasets and
thus controlling for most or all plausible causal variables.11 Taken together,
this substantial corpus of evidence points inexorably in one direction: Racebased inequality, gender-based inequality, and similar social ills are driven
by decisions disfavoring members of disadvantaged groups because of their
membership in those groups.
10 Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo, Field Experiments on Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC FIELD EXPERIMENTS 309, 310–11, 315–16 (Esther Duflo & Abhijit Banerjee eds., 2017)
(collecting studies on discrimination across various social domains).
11 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63–71 (discussing Professors M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja
Starr’s work on criminal sentencing).
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A necessarily incomplete survey of the scholarly literature
demonstrating pervasive discrimination follows:
•

•

Discrimination in employment: Businesses refuse to interview Black
workers while readily interviewing otherwise-identical white ones.12
Employers prefer white applicants over Black ones even in markets for
high-skill, college-educated workers.13 When employers do hire Black
workers, they pay them less than white ones, even when there are no
differences in actual productivity.14 Employers, in fact, discriminate in
hiring against all nonwhite groups.15 They also routinely discriminate
on the basis of religion, sexuality, age, caste, and gender.16
Discrimination in criminal justice: Judges and prosecutors impose
harsher sentences based on both race and gender. Black and Hispanic
defendants are punished more than otherwise-identical white
defendants, and men are punished more than women.17 Prior to
sentencing, all-white juries discriminate against Black defendants,
convicting them more readily than white defendants.18 And even

12 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1011
(2004).
13 See John M. Nunley, Adam Pugh, Nicholas Romero & R. Alan Seals, Racial Discrimination in
the Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 15 B.E. J. ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1093, 1122 (2015).
14 See Roland G. Fryer Jr., Devah Pager & Jörg L. Spenkuch, Racial Disparities in Job Finding and
Offered Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON. 633, 635–36 (2013); Valerie Wilson & William M. Rodgers III, BlackWhite Wage Gaps Expand with Rising Wage Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.epi.org/publication/black-white-wage-gaps-expand-with-rising-wage-inequality/
[https://perma.cc/JTR8-H8AY]. In Fryer, Pager & Spenkuch’s study, the dataset included workers’ wages
in their most recent jobs. Fryer et al., supra, at 646. This is a nearly direct observation of worker
productivity—the foundational “legitimate” trait for which employers are allowed to select when hiring.
This sets the study apart from other nonexperimental data-based work. The study found that, conditional
on productivity as measured by most recent wages, Black candidates were hired less and paid lower wages
than white ones. Id. at 635–36.
15 See Nicolas Jacquemet & Constantine Yannelis, Indiscriminate Discrimination: A
Correspondence Test for Ethnic Homophily in the Chicago Labor Market, 19 LAB. ECON. 824,
832 (2012).
16 Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 325–27.
17 See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J.
POL. ECON. 1320, 1349 (2014); Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities
in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 98 (2015); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 298–303 (2001).
The extraordinarily rich data and resulting robust controls used in the Rehavi & Starr and Yang studies
are discussed in Section II.B.1, infra.
18 See Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal
Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1032 (2012).
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•

•

•

before trial, the police discriminate on the basis of race in searches,
citations, and arrests.19
Discrimination in financial transactions: In consumer markets,
landlords discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, immigration
status, and sexual orientation.20 Automobile retailers are less willing to
sell to ethnic minorities than to members of the majority group.21
Lenders make fewer and worse loans to Black applicants than
otherwise-identical white ones.22 Customers disfavor men when asked
to tip.23
Discrimination in healthcare: Doctors underestimate the pain
experienced by Black patients compared with white patients who
report similar pain.24 Emergency medical providers are more likely to
transport Black and Hispanic patients to low-quality safety-net
emergency rooms than white patients residing in the same zip code.25
Cardiologists are less likely to recommend treatment for Black,
Hispanic, and Asian patients, even for serious cardiac disease. 26
Discrimination in education: In primary and secondary education,
teachers and school administrators punish Black children more harshly

19 See Sarath Sanga, Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory
and
Evidence,
117 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1156–59
(2009)
(searches);
Jeremy
West, Racial Bias in Police Investigations 19–20 (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://people.ucsc.edu/~jwest1/articles/West_RacialBiasPolice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4GZ-QJTA]
(citations); John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 367, 390 (2001) (arrests).
20 Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 328 (collecting studies).
21 See Asaf Zussman, Ethnic Discrimination: Lessons from the Israeli Online Market for Used Cars,
123 ECON. J. F433, F466 (2013).
22 See Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of Discrimination from
Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RES. 53, 65, 89 (2011); see also Ping Cheng, Zhenguo Lin & Yingchun Liu,
Racial Discrepancy in Mortgage Interest Rates, 51 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 101, 118 (collecting
studies and presenting new results).
23 See Bharat Chandar, Uri Gneezy, John A. List & Ian Muir, The Drivers of Social Preferences:
Evidence from a Nationwide Tipping Field Experiment 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 26380, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26380/w26380.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8L3P-2S3D].
24 See Kelly M. Hoffman, Sophie Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt & M. Norman Oliver, Racial Bias in Pain
Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between
Blacks and Whites, 113 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4296, 4296–97 (2016) (collecting studies).
25 See Amresh D. Hanchate, Michael K. Paasche-Orlow, William E. Baker, Meng-Yun
Lin, Souvik Banerjee & James Feldman, Association of Race/Ethnicity with Emergency
Department Destination of Emergency Medical Services Transport, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Sept. 6,
2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2749448 [https://perma.cc/2B2HBMLG].
26 See Nancy R. Kressin & Laura A. Petersen, Racial Differences in the Use of Invasive
Cardiovascular Procedures: Review of the Literature and Prescription for Future Research,
135 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 352, 363 (2001) (collecting studies).
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for a given infraction than their peers.27 And at the postsecondary level,
faculty are less responsive to, and less willing to make time for, their
female and minority students.28

As a result of this weighty body of evidence, there is no longer much
disagreement, even among hard-nosed economists, about whether
discrimination is pervasive.29 Instead, the modern academic debate is about
why people discriminate. Do they engage in “taste-based” discrimination,
whereby decision-makers indulge their animus toward certain groups? Or do
they instead engage in “statistical discrimination?” There, low-information
decision-makers assume each individual member of a disadvantaged group
bears some negative trait because the group, on average, is more likely to
bear it.30
American antidiscrimination law does not distinguish between these
two types of bias. Both are illegal.31 That is, it is no more a defense in a
discrimination suit to say “I fired him because I assumed that, because he
was Black, he would be less productive” than to say “I fired him because I
dislike Black people.” The former is forbidden even if, in a given profession,
the average Black worker could be proven to be less productive than others.
There is no legal license to stereotype, even for stereotypes that reflect some
kernel of statistical truth.32

27

See Ying Shi & Maria Zhu, Equal Time for Equal Crime? Racial Bias in School Discipline 17
(IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 14306, 2021), http://ftp.iza.org/dp14306.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27PD-PBH7].
28 See Katherine L. Milkman, Modupe Akinola & Dolly Chugh, Temporal Distance and
Discrimination: An Audit Study in Academia, 23 PSYCH. SCI. 710, 711 (2012).
29 See Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 310–12; cf. Jennifer L. Doleac, A Review of Thomas
Sowell’s Discrimination and Disparities, 59 J. ECON. LIT. 574, 576 (2021) (book review) (noting that a
rare dissenter from this consensus view did “not engage at all with the large and ever-growing economic
literature on whether people are treated differently due to their race”).
30 Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 311.
31 Id. at 312; City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978).
32 Outlawing both kinds of discrimination is likely good policy. Historically, some economists
suggested that statistical discrimination should be legal since it reflects no animus and could lead to more
efficient allocations of labor. Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 228, 228 (1986). However, more recent scholarship suggests that this is wrong. It shows how
statistical discrimination in fact benefits individual institutions at the expense of society as a whole. See
Doleac, supra note 29, at 577–79 (collecting studies). In short, statistical discrimination rationally
disincentivizes those at whom it is aimed from investing in valuable skills. This increases statistical
discrimination in turn, setting off a downward spiral. Thus, in addition to being morally objectionable,
statistical discrimination is likely inefficient at the societal level. Our legal rules forbidding statistical
discrimination therefore solve a collective action problem, making everyone, including employers,
better off.

831

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In sum, the evidence is clear. Discrimination persists. It produces
substantial inequality, pervading all aspects of everyday life. Solutions are
sorely needed.
B. Popular Interventions Do Not Work
Assuming modern discrimination is driven by widespread prejudicial
attitudes—whether conscious or unconscious—one appealing solution
would be to eliminate those attitudes. If there were a reliable treatment to
cure discriminatory thinking, or even just reduce it substantially, one might
hope that racial equality would follow. And of course, ridding people of their
invidious attitudes surely has intrinsic value as well.
Proposals for “de-biasing” treatments therefore abound, including from
respected empirical psychologists. These proposals are creative and diverse.
Researchers advocate: “cognitive conditioning” (training the mind to regard
minority groups positively); “contact” interventions (promoting interaction
with members of minority groups); individual introspection, including on
moral values like equality; and more.33 Today, such treatments are regularly
packaged into innumerably variegated “diversity trainings” or “antibias
seminars” and deployed at corporate headquarters, university campuses,
public schools, and beyond.
De-biasing treatments are not the only possible mainstream alternative
to Big Data Affirmative Action. Another intervention for curing
discrimination might be to blind more decision-makers to their subjects’
race. This could work in some contexts, but the applications are limited. It is
hard to imagine, for example, a judge sentencing a criminal defendant
without ever meeting him, even by video. The same goes for hiring. Few
companies are willing to make long-term hiring decisions without requiring
even a single meeting from which race could be inferred. De-biasing
trainings and Big Data Affirmative Action are thus natural comparators in
that they are ambitious in their scope. Both solutions aim for broad
applicability.
The problem with de-biasing trainings is that they do not actually work.
A meta-study by Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Roni Porat, Chelsey Clark, and
Donald Green, published last year in the Annual Review of Psychology,
evaluates the state of the evidence. Paluck and her colleagues performed a
“random effects meta-analysis of all prejudice-reduction interventions from

33 Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Roni Porat, Chelsey S. Clark & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction:
Progress and Challenges, 72 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 533, 543–45, 547 (2021).
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2007 to 2019.”34 They evaluated some “418 studies, which report 1,292
distinct point estimates.”35
The evaluated studies themselves report only modest effects. On
average, the studies claim that their interventions are only good enough to
move someone with a “mildly negative feeling” about Black people to
“nearly reaching a neutral feeling.”36 Another “way to look at this effect size
is that following an intervention, there would be an 85% overlap between
people who went through the intervention and people who were in the
control group.”37 Moreover, these results are mostly from the lab. When
interventions are deployed in real-world settings like diversity trainings, the
studies’ reported effects shrink even further.38
Also worth noting is the fact that almost none of the literature even
attempts to measure the effect of antibias interventions on discriminatory
behavior. Most studies instead measure the interventions’ effects on
conscious or unconscious racial attitudes.39 But biased attitudes do not equal
biased behavior, and the link between unconscious bias and behavior is
especially controversial.40 Furthermore, even assuming attitudes did strongly
affect behavior, the literature reports that de-biasing interventions’ effects on
attitudes are fleeting. They fade to nothing after just a few hours or, at most,
a few days.41
Worse, there is substantial evidence that these modest results reported
in the primary literature are vastly overblown. De-biasing research appears
to be yet another victim of the “replication crisis” sweeping across empirical
psychology as a whole.42 One source of this widespread nonreplicability is
“publication bias”—whereby splashy, but statistically random, results get
published, while null results get trashed. As Paluck and her coauthors write,
“A telltale sign of publication bias is a strong positive relationship between
reported effects and their standard errors . . . . Our collection of studies

34

Id. at 539.
Id.
36 Id. at 540.
37 Id. at 553.
38 Id. at 542–43.
39 Id. at 548–49.
40 Id. at 548–49, 553.
41 Id. at 550, 545–46; Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: II. Intervention
Effectiveness Across Time, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1001, 1012 (2016).
42 Bradford J. Wiggins & Cody D. Christopherson, The Replication Crisis in Psychology: An
Overview for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCH. 202, 202–
03 (2019); Paluck et al., supra note 33, at 538.
35
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displays a powerful relationship of this kind.”43 As a result, the effect-size
results “are not robust to the most basic assessments of study quality.”44
“In the absence of publication bias, we should obtain similar average
effect estimates from small and from large studies.”45 Yet in the de-biasing
literature, small studies—with less statistical power—consistently reported
substantially larger effects than large ones. On average, the smallest studies
reported more than twice the effect of the largest. When only large, highpowered studies are considered, the effect size is minute.46 Indeed, the
publication bias in this literature appears so strong that
a study large enough to generate a standard error of approximately zero would,
on average, produce no change in prejudice at all. In other words, if the current
collection of studies had been conducted on a much larger scale, our analysis
would have shown no reduction in prejudice.47

Unfortunately, we do not yet know how to reliably make humans
meaningfully less racist, sexist, or otherwise prejudiced. Even the rosiest
evaluations of our best interventions show modest results—far smaller than
would be needed to meaningfully redress discrimination in any domain. And
those rosy estimates are quite likely to be wildly overconfident. This does
not mean that researchers will never figure out how to fix discrimination
from the inside out. But as of today, we cannot do it, and interventions
designed around the idea of de-biasing human attitudes or behaviors will not
work. New proposals are needed now. The millions of Americans today who
are systematically shunted into worse jobs, increased criminalization, less
healthcare, and other unfair outcomes cannot afford to wait.
II. BIG DATA AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action, unlike other policy interventions, does work. “A
long literature documents” the success of old-fashioned affirmative action
policies in reducing unfair outcomes for disadvantaged groups.48 Such
policies have, for example, opened the door to Black and female workers in
industries where they were previously unwelcome.49 They have diversified

43

Paluck et al., supra note 33, at 538.
Id. at 541.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 553–54.
47 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
48 Doleac, supra note 29, at 584–85.
49 Id. at 584; Fidan Ana Kurtulus, The Impact of Affirmative Action on the Employment of Minorities
and Women: A Longitudinal Analysis Using Three Decades of EEO-1 Filings, 35 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 34, 39–40 (2016).
44
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police forces.50 In fact, affirmative action is powerful enough that its
discrimination-reducing effects persist after the intervention has lapsed.51
Big Data Affirmative Action is the next evolutionary phase of this triedand-true approach. It is affirmative action in the traditional sense: it disburses
benefits to members of disadvantaged groups (racial minorities, religious
minorities, sexual minorities, women) because of their membership in those
groups. But unlike old-fashioned affirmative action, Big Data Affirmative
Action distributes benefits automatically, algorithmically, and precisely.
This Part describes the technology underlying Big Data Affirmative
Action and explains how it could be used as a general matter to correct
wrongful discrimination. It then proposes specific real-world examples.
A. How Big Data Affirmative Action Works
Big Data Affirmative Action operates via sophisticated statistical
analysis of large datasets obtained and maintained by the potential
discriminator: employers, admissions offices, hospitals, courts, and so on.
The analysis produces measurements that determine both who gets benefits
and how much is due.
Large employers today, for example, keep records of hundreds of
thousands of job applications, hiring decisions, salary offers, and
promotions. These datasets are not simply large; they are rich. They contain
information about workers’ educational history, employment history,
geography, and more.52 They also can, and often do, contain information
about workers’ membership in legally protected classes—like race, gender,
or sexual orientation.53 Employers further enrich these datasets over the
course of the hiring process, recording job-relevant performance metrics like
test scores and peer reviews.54 The resulting datasets contain information
50 Doleac, supra note 29, at 584 n.7; Amalia R. Miller & Carmit Segal, Does Temporary Affirmative
Action Produce Persistent Effects? A Study of Black and Female Employment in Law Enforcement,
94 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1107, 1124 (2012).
51 Doleac, supra note 29, at 584; Conrad Miller, The Persistent Effect of Temporary Affirmative
Action, 9 AM. ECON. J. 152, 153 (2017).
52 See, e.g., Elena Yakimova, 6 Steps to Make Your Recruiter Database Better, SPICEWORKS (Dec.
16, 2021), https://www.spiceworks.com/hr/recruitment-onboarding/articles/6-steps-to-make-yourrecruiter-database-better/ [https://perma.cc/TKC2-EFUV] (describing how human-resources departments
can use a database-management system to manage recruiter data, including candidates’ current and past
employment, marital status, and more).
53 See National Origin Discrimination – FAQs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/national-origin-discrimination-faqs [https://perma.cc/J4B5-A7GF] (noting
that employers collect such information, among other reasons, to satisfy reporting requirements).
54 See Dana Pessach, Gonen Singer, Dan Avrahami, Hila Chalutz Ben-Gal, Erez Shmueli & Irad
Ben-Gal, Employees Recruitment: A Prescriptive Analytics Approach via Machine Learning and
Mathematical Programming, 134 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 1, 6 (2020).
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about essentially every factor that, rightly or wrongly, might have influenced
each ultimate employment decision.
Armed with such rich data, careful practitioners of modern statistical
analysis can tease out which factors actually did influence the final decisions.
They can do so using straightforward and well-understood statistical models
like least squares regressions. Regression models work by isolating the
distinct relationship that each of many different inputs has on a single output
of interest.
To create a Big Data Affirmative Action plan, such a model would first
be used to determine, for example, the effect of job applicants’ race on their
salary. Using a regression model or a similar technique, data scientists would
“hold constant” the other explanatory variables in the data, thus isolating
racial penalties. Put another way, they would determine whether, once
“legitimate” factors influencing pay (education, experience, test scores, etc.)
were held equal, race-correlated salary disparities remained. If so, the best
inference would be that discrimination was the cause.
This kind of statistical analysis is by no means theoretical. Such data
work has long been the bread and butter of empirical social science;
innumerable examples exist.55 Indeed, regression analysis and similar
approaches are so well understood as to be somewhat old-fashioned. Recent
years have seen an explosion in the use of new machine learning models—
like neural networks or random forests—to make decisions based on large
datasets.56 However, such newer models would generally not be ideal for use
in Big Data Affirmative Action. Unlike regression models, these new tools
are not designed to cleanly isolate the effect of various inputs on a given
output.57 Thus, while useful for many tasks, they are not well suited for
analyzing a large dataset to isolate the effect of race—or another protected
characteristic—on a particular outcome.
Astute readers will note here that randomized controlled trials, not
statistical analyses, are the gold-standard technique for identifying cause and
effect. True. But as just discussed, many such trials have already established
that discrimination is pervasive, driving disparate outcomes across social
domains. This should update our priors significantly in favor of data-analytic
analyses that show the same. It is one thing to be skeptical of statistics when
a general effect is not well established. It is another entirely to be skeptical
when the statistics simply confirm yet another instance of a well-established
phenomenon. Not even careful academic econometricians would argue that,
55

Supra Section I.A (describing studies on race-based discrimination across social domains).
TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL
LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 9, 337, 352, 412 (2d ed. 2009).
57 See Peter N. Salib, Artificially Intelligent Class Actions, 100 TEX. L. REV. 519, 543 (2022).
56
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once a general problem is rigorously established, every individual policy
response to that problem requires original research publishable in
Econometrica. Thus, as policy interventions go, Big Data Affirmative
Action’s grounding in statistical analysis is about as scientific as it gets.58
Importantly, the statistical models undergirding Big Data Affirmative
Action would reveal not only the existence but also the quantum of
discriminatory harm. Once an employer knows, for example, how much less
money its Black employees are paid on account of their being Black, the
employer can do something about it. Under a Big Data Affirmative Action
plan, an employer would adjust salary offers for Black employees upward
by just that amount. Such adjustments could be made algorithmically and
automatically. Neither employees nor employers would have to make any
conscious changes. Everyone would proceed normally through the job
application and hiring process, including salary negotiations. Upon
entry of the new hire’s salary into an HR system, an algorithm could simply
increase that salary by the amount the statistical model prescribed. Similar
adjustments could be made algorithmically for existing Black
employees, too.
Moreover, Big Data Affirmative Action policies could correct for
multiple kinds of discrimination at once. Suppose a job applicant is both
Black and a woman. Both groups face pay discrimination on account of their
identities. But it does not necessarily follow that the discrimination is
additive and linear. That is, the penalty for being a Black woman may not
simply be the penalty for being a woman plus the penalty for being Black. A
sophisticated Big Data Affirmative Action plan could include an analysis
of—and thus a correction for—discrimination against Black women,
specifically. In this way, Big Data Affirmative Action can be sensitive to
what is sometimes called the “intersectionality” of discrimination.59
How large would the benefits disbursed under Big Data Affirmative
Action be? This would vary by context, since the amount of discrimination
would likewise vary with the institution implementing the policy. It is
important to note, however, that any single Big Data Affirmative Action
policy’s benefits would almost inevitably be smaller than gross observed
58 Big Data Affirmative Action need not always rely on data analytics. In some cases, discrimination
might be measured using true randomized controlled trials—as with the economic studies that randomly
vary names on resumes. See Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 319. However, such studies are of limited
use when the decision under examination involves direct human-to-human contact. Id. at 318. There is,
as of yet, no way to randomly assign a race, gender, or other protected identity to a living breathing
person. Thus, many—likely most—Big Data Affirmative Action policies would be grounded in statistical
analysis of real-world data.
59 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140.
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racial or other disparities. Consider again an employer that wishes to adjust
salaries using Big Data Affirmative Action. Suppose that it observes that its
Hispanic employees are paid, on average, 30% less than their white
colleagues. At first blush, then, it seems that the company should adjust
every Hispanic employee’s pay upward by thirty cents on the dollar.
But perhaps the mix of jobs within these two groups is different.
Perhaps white employees are comparatively likely to work as engineers,
whose skills are particularly scarce and expensive. Moreover, even within
job functions, there might be legitimate differences. Perhaps among
engineers, white workers are more likely to be proficient in Python, a highly
in-demand programming language.60 This, too, might be a justifiable reason
for additional pay, assuming that Python skills remain scarce relative to
demand. A Big Data Affirmative Action policy would control for such
legitimate differences in job function. As a result, the policy’s
salary adjustments would account only for the differences between,
for example, Hispanic and white Python programmers. Once non-racebased, legitimately-work-related factors were accounted for, the observed
Hispanic–white disparity, and thus the Big Data Affirmative Action
adjustment, might only be, say, 10%.
Note that well-designed Big Data Affirmative Action policies could and
should be updated regularly. Either the implementation of such a policy or
secular trends could cause measured discrimination to change over time.
Thus, if subsequent data showed a shift in discrimination over time, an
updated policy might increase Hispanic engineers’ salaries by, say, 8 or 12%,
rather than 10%.
It is tempting to insist on a salary adjustment of the full 30% disparity
for the company’s Hispanic workers. This is especially true because the
aforementioned “legitimate” differences in job functions or qualifications
might themselves be caused by discrimination. Perhaps more white than
Hispanic employees are software engineers because of discriminatory
practices in funding and allocating elementary math instruction. Perhaps
differences in technical qualifications among engineers were caused by
similar race-based exclusion in college or graduate education. Yet a welldesigned Big Data Affirmative Action policy would ignore all of this
potential upstream discrimination.
This conservative approach is pragmatic. As will be discussed below,
the legal rules governing affirmative action policies are strict. And an
affirmative action policy that is struck down as illegal helps no one. Thus, a
60 See 11 Most In-Demand Programming Languages in 2022, BERKELEY BOOT CAMPS,
https://bootcamp.berkeley.edu/blog/most-in-demand-programming-languages/ [https://perma.cc/D5LYYP2N].
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cardinal objective in designing Big Data Affirmative Action policies is to
comply with the law. And as it stands, the law currently limits a given
institution’s affirmative action policies to correcting only the institution’s
own discrimination.61 A company may correct its own failure to pay Hispanic
engineers the same as similarly qualified white engineers. But it has no
legal authority to correct for discrimination in primary education, college,
or elsewhere.
Nonetheless, Big Data Affirmative Action could be a powerful tool for
redressing discrimination. Certainly, each individual policy would correct
only a modest quantum of discrimination imposed by a single institution. But
as discussed below, if such policies were implemented by many institutions,
they would aggregate to produce large effects.
There is ample reason to think that Big Data Affirmative Action could
be implemented broadly by various institutions whose decisions drive
persistent racial inequality. Lots of them—employers, hospitals, courts,
lenders—already have the necessary data. From there, the task is simple: take
the existing data, hire a competent data scientist, and turn her loose. This,
too, is already being done in some corners of the private sector. Uber, for
example, recently hired the eminent economist John List, who used its rich
datasets covering millions of drivers and tens of millions of rides to
determine whether Uber drivers faced a discriminatory gender-based pay
gap.62 Nothing stops more institutions from doing the same.
The potential applications of Big Data Affirmative Action are far
too numerous to explore exhaustively here. However, by way of survey, the
next Section sketches three specific examples of Big Data Affirmative
Action policies: one for criminal sentencing, one to correct employment
discrimination, and one to combat the much-ballyhooed threat of algorithmic
discrimination. These examples highlight both the diversity of potential
applications for Big Data Affirmative Action, as well as possible challenges.
The latter, it will be argued, can generally be overcome.
B. Big Data Affirmative Action in Action
This Section describes three example Big Data Affirmative Action
policies: for discrimination in criminal sentencing, discrimination in pay,

61

See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
See Alison Griswold, Uber’s Secret Weapon Is Its Team of Economists, QUARTZ (July 20, 2022),
https://qz.com/1367800/ubernomics-is-ubers-semi-secret-internal-economics-department/
[https://perma.cc/4SKZ-HCYY]; Cody Cook, Rebecca Diamond, Jonathan V. Hall, John A. List & Paul
Oyer, The Gender Earnings Gap in the Gig Economy: Evidence from over a Million Rideshare Drivers
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24732, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w24732/w24732.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE2T-JK67].
62
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and algorithmic discrimination. These examples demonstrate Big Data
Affirmative Action’s broad potential to roll back unfair discrimination across
a wide range of distinct and important contexts. The goal here is to give a
sense of feasibility. Each context presents its own unique hurdles. But
despite their differences, each set of challenges to implementing Big Data
Affirmative Action can be overcome.
1. De-Biasing Criminal Sentences
Criminal sentences are wildly unequal. In raw terms, Black defendants
are sentenced to terms of imprisonment between 50% and 100% longer than
whites.63 Recently, academics have sought to quantify the proportion of this
disparity attributable to discrimination in the courthouse. In doing so, they
have produced exactly the kind of statistical evidence on which Big Data
Affirmative Action policies could be based.
In their recent paper, Professors M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja B. Starr
estimate the magnitude of discrimination by members of the federal criminal
justice system. Rehavi and Starr leverage a large “linked multiagency data
set that follows federal cases from arrest through to sentencing.”64 This
includes “individual records from the US Marshals Service (which collects
arrest data), federal prosecutors, federal courts, and the US Sentencing
Commission,” constituting “a complete picture of each individual’s path
through the federal justice system.”65 The resulting dataset catalogues the
information of 36,659 men arrested between 2006 and 2008.66
Such rich data allow Rehavi and Starr to control for essentially every
credible “legitimate” factor that might explain the racial disparity. They use
U.S. Marshals Service records to control for the arrest offense, as recorded
by the arresting officer.67 This helps to ensure that estimates of racial
discrimination are based on actual criminal conduct rather than bargained (or
biased) charging decisions. They control for the presence of multiple
defendants—which indicates a conspiracy and more serious criminal
conduct. They control for criminal history, since serial offenders may
justifiably be punished more harshly. They control for possible differences
in effectiveness between publicly appointed and privately retained counsel.
They even control for demographic factors like education, age, geography,
income, and employment.68 The wisdom of basing criminal sentences on
63

Rehavi & Starr, supra note 17, at 1337–38.
Id. at 1321.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1328.
67 Id. at 1331, 1337. Rehavi and Starr use multiple approaches to capturing the severity of actual
conduct, including ones designed to account for possible gaps in the data. Id. at 1338–43.
68 Id. at 1331, 1337, 1342.
64
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such demographic factors is questionable, to say the least.69 But variation
along these lines is at least formally race neutral.
Even controlling for all of these factors, Rehavi and Starr find that
Black defendants are sentenced to terms of incarceration 9% longer than
otherwise-identical white defendants.70 Using an alternate statistical
approach but the same controls, they reach a similar result: Black defendants
are sentenced to an average of seven months more incarceration than
whites—a gap explained only by race.71
Other similar studies have reached much the same conclusion.
Professor Crystal S. Yang has estimated that federal judges use their
discretion to impose three additional months of imprisonment on Black
defendants.72 This is consistent with Rehavi and Starr’s finding that roughly
half of their seven-month disparity may be attributable to prosecutorial
discrimination, and the other half judicial.73 Writing a decade before Yang,
Starr, and Rehavi, Professor David B. Mustard found that Black defendants
were sentenced to 4.81 extra months of incarceration compared with
whites.74 This estimate is congruent with Yang’s evidence that the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, decided after Mustard’s study
but before hers, increased the Black–white gap by about two months.75
Studies like these—both their findings and their mere existence—show
three related things. First, there is substantial and empirically verifiable
discrimination happening in federal courthouses, driving racial disparities in
sentencing. Second, discovering and quantifying such discrimination is
possible. The data can be assembled, even if doing so requires linking
different agencies’ databases. True, the above studies are of federal criminal
defendants, and states have long lagged behind the feds in their data
collection practices.76 But this has begun to change in recent years, with
nineteen states having recently mandated more-comprehensive data

69 Reliance on such factors was mostly disallowed before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), and remains disfavored. See Yang, supra note 17, at 98.
70 Rehavi & Starr, supra note 17, at 1338.
71 Id.
72 Yang, supra note 17, at 108.
73 Rehavi & Starr, supra note 17, at 1343.
74 Mustard, supra note 17, at 298.
75 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines optional, increasing the
opportunity for discrimination in sentencing. Yang, supra note 17, at 77.
76 See Amy Bach, Missing: Criminal Justice Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/opinion/missing-criminal-justice-data.html
[https://perma.cc/R2XA-PNPP].
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collection.77 This suggests that implementing Big Data Affirmative Action
in state criminal courts is largely a question of will. States that wish to do it
can mandate both the affirmative action and the data collection needed to
implement it.
Third and finally, these studies show that Big Data Affirmative Action
is a viable policy tool for correcting discrimination in criminal sentencing.
Statistical analyses like Rehavi and Starr’s can supply the information
needed to correct biased courthouse decisions. These studies are precise. As
already noted, Rehavi and Starr found that the penalty for being Black in the
federal criminal justice system is 9% more incarceration. The Big Data
Affirmative Action remedy, then, is to reduce Black defendants’ sentences
by 9%. The literature also estimates discrimination—and thus quantifies the
necessary Big Data Affirmative Action correction—for other groups. Yang’s
results show that Hispanic defendants receive sentences, on average, 1.9
months longer than similar white defendants.78 Under a Big Data Affirmative
Action sentencing policy, their sentences would then be reduced by 1.9
months on average.
According to Mustard’s analysis, women’s sentences are over five
months shorter than comparable men’s sentences.79 This result raises an
interesting puzzle for Big Data Affirmative Action: In the presence of
discrimination, which outcome should be viewed as the “correct” baseline?
In the case of, for example, Black–white disparities, it is natural to assume
that white defendants are being treated fairly and Black defendants are being
unjustifiably mistreated. That inference is easy, given the hundreds of years
of outrageous, yet widely accepted, mistreatment Black Americans have
suffered. But in the case of male–female disparities in incarceration, it is
tempting to assume that female defendants are being treated irrationally well.
It is yet another familiar, pernicious stereotype that women are passive,
weak, and impulsive. Such tropes could add up to a misperception of women
as less dangerous and thus less worthy of punishment than an objective
assessment would reveal.
What to do? Should Big Data Affirmative Action sentencing policies
increase women’s terms of incarceration to match men’s? Should it reduce
men’s incarceration to match women’s? Should it do a bit of both, so that the
genders meet in the middle? Substantive antidiscrimination law generally

77 See Examples of Statewide Criminal Justice Data Repositories, OHIO CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N
(Dec. 2020), https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/Sentencing/committees/uniformSentEntry/
RepositoryExamplesFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLK8-AYND] (collecting statutes).
78 Yang, supra note 17, at 92.
79 Mustard, supra note 17, at 298.
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permits any of these as a cure for discrimination.80 Thus, in most Big Data
Affirmative Action contexts, the answer to this kind of question will depend
on one’s normative—or perhaps empirical—views. Here, the “correct” level
of criminal sanction will depend on one’s theory of punishment, along with
the evidence about the best way to achieve a given theory’s goals.
And once that “correct” sentence is determined, a Big Data Affirmative
Action algorithm can intervene to adjust sentences accordingly to match the
desired output.
In the sentencing context, Booker complicates things—but only
slightly. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, a jury must find any facts that are used to increase
incarceration.81 Thus, a Big Data Affirmative Action policy that increased
women’s sentences would have to include jury findings about the operative
information. This would not usually be difficult, since proving a defendant’s
gender beyond a reasonable doubt would almost always be trivial.82
However, a Big Data Affirmative Action policy that only decreased
sentences would face no Booker problem at all.
2. Correcting Pay Disparities
Big Data Affirmative Action for pay disparities presents comparatively
few complications. As with criminal sentencing, voluminous evidence from
social science reveals that women and minorities are paid less than relevantly
identical white men. Much of this research proceeds, like the criminal
sentencing studies, via statistical analysis of rich datasets. Professors Kevin
Lang and Michael Manove, for example, find a substantial market-wide
Black–white wage gap, even after controlling for cognitive aptitude, level of
education, quality of education, age, parents’ education, number of siblings,
immigration status, parents’ immigration status, and geography.83 Many
additional data-analytic studies likewise reveal invidious disparities

Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017) (describing the “remedial
alternatives”).
81 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). Technically, Booker holds that juries must find
any facts that would automatically increase the maximum sentence. Id. at 227–28. But the logic applies
straightforwardly to a Big Data Affirmative Action policy that automatically increases the defendant’s
actual sentence.
82 The particular facts affecting a sentence would depend on the statistical evidence of discrimination.
If gender interacted with age in some way—say, if young women got even more favorable treatment than
older ones—both facts would have to be proven. In any case, this kind of demographic information will
be controversial only rarely. Indeed, in the mine-run of cases, a defendant’s sustained denial of a longheld identity or easily proved fact would likely be sanctionable. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b)(2).
83 Kevin Lang & Michael Manove, Education and Labor Market Discrimination, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 1467, 1482, 1491 (2011).
80
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unexplained by “legitimate” wage determinants.84 Other studies are
experimental. Professors Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan
famously show that employers are 50% more likely to respond to resumes
bearing white-sounding names than to otherwise-identical resumes carrying
Black-sounding names.85 Still other studies take even more creative
approaches. Professors Roland Fryer, Devah Pager, and Jörg Spenkuch
compare employers’ wage offers to Black and white job seekers to those
workers’ previous salaries, using the latter figure as a metric of actual
productivity. They, too, find substantial racial discrimination.86
Worth noticing here is not just the fact that economists can—and do—
generate highly credible estimates of pay discrimination in various segments
of the labor force. It is that they do so despite their task being much harder
than it would be for employers to measure their own discrimination.
Economists are generally on the outside looking in. They therefore have to
make creative guesses about what information is available to employers
offering wages and, moreover, about what information employers actually
considered.87 Employers, by contrast, know all of that. They know what
information is collected in the application process. They know what
questions are asked in the interviews. They know the metrics on which
applicants and current employees are evaluated.
Insofar as employers do not know any of this, they can find out,
including by mandate. That is, employers can simply decide as a matter of
84

See generally, e.g., Mary Corcoran & Greg J. Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment,
and Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RES. 3 (1979) (finding that
differences in education, training, and job performance explained only a small proportion of the wage
gaps between white men and other groups); Francine D. Blau & Andrea H. Beller, Black-White Earnings
over the 1970s and 1980s: Gender Differences in Trends, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 276 (1992) (finding
unexplained differences and tracking their variation over time); Ronald L. Oaxaca & Michael R. Ransom,
On Discrimination and the Decomposition of Wage Differentials, 61 J. ECONOMETRICS 5, 12–18 (1994)
(employing a variety of methods to show the Black–white wage gap is explained at least in part by labormarket discrimination); William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in
Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 63 (1998) (collecting studies on
employment discrimination); Cordelia W. Reimers, Labor Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and
Black Men, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 570 (1983) (finding that differences in measured characteristics, not
overt discrimination, overwhelmingly explained the white–Hispanic wage gap).
85 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 12, at 997–98; see also, e.g., Michael Firth, Racial
Discrimination in the British Labor Market, 34 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 265, 272 (1981) (finding
considerable discrimination in British employers’ assessment of job applicants of various nationalities);
A. Esmail & S. Everington, Racial Discrimination Against Doctors from Ethnic Minorities, 306 BRITISH
MED. J. 691, 692 (1993) (finding applicants with English names were twice as likely to be selected for
hospital posts than candidates with Asian names).
86 See Fryer et al., supra note 14, at 634–36.
87 See Bertrand & Duflo, supra note 10, at 332 (“[W]ith more continuous outcome variables—ones
that typically are not available to the researcher, such as the ranking of the job candidates by the
employer—[it] would . . . be possible to resolve this tension.”).
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policy what does and does not matter for hiring or setting pay. In this way,
they can—and already do—limit what hiring managers may permissibly
consider. Then employers can collect that information and hand the data over
to statistical empiricists.88 In the resulting study, the institutionally approved
job-relevant criteria would function as controls. And any unexplained racecorrelated disparities not eliminated by those controls would count as
discrimination by the firm. The measured disparities, in turn, would be used
to design a Big Data Affirmative Action algorithm that eliminated them
ex post.
One could argue that this approach fails to produce true measures
of employer discrimination. Perhaps some hiring managers would defy
company policy and consider additional race-correlated factors that, in their
views, mattered to job performance. Those would arguably be “legitimate”
factors explaining pay disparities but not controlled for in the statistical
analysis. On the other hand, a hiring manager’s ad hoc reliance on
unapproved, race-correlated attributes might just as likely mask the
manager’s own racial bias as it may accurately predict performance. By
comparison, firm-level evaluations of performance metrics rest on
substantially more data and experience, both across the firm and over time,
than those of a single manager.
Perhaps for these reasons, when a firm decides to designate certain
factors as irrelevant to job performance and pay, antidiscrimination law
treats that policy as decisive.89 A business cannot rebut, for example, a
compensation policy’s racially disparate impact by arguing that the disparity
is explained by factors it has affirmatively disavowed as relevant.90 It is
therefore both normatively and legally appealing to treat race-correlated
salary disparities unrelated to a company’s carefully considered list of job
qualifications as remediable discrimination.
3. Undoing Algorithmic Discrimination
Algorithmic bias is a topic du jour in the antidiscrimination literature.
Algorithms—both the simple and the bafflingly complex—now guide
decisions across an incredible range of domains.91 They make
hiring recommendations, determine who gets bail and who is jailed,

88

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 564–67, 587–88 (2009) (treating an employer’s official policy
regarding job-related skills as decisive in a disparate impact case).
90 See id. at 587–89.
91 See Salib, supra note 57, at 567.
89
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authorize or deny home loans, and more.92 Many scholars argue
that the use of such algorithmic decision-making causes or entrenches
discriminatory outcomes.93
Some algorithmic discrimination can be mitigated via careful
algorithmic design.94 But in the end, algorithms that mimic human decisions
risk mimicking human bias too. Consider, for example, an algorithm trained
to automate a firm’s hiring recommendations based on data from its past
hires. Here, certain input data may be biased. Nonwhite applicants may be
more likely to have attended for-profit colleges not ranked by U.S. News.95
If the hiring algorithm assesses educational quality using U.S. News scores,
such missing data will bias its outputs. Bias of this kind can be ameliorated
by correcting missing data or switching to another more comprehensive
metric. But not all bias is so easily avoided. The whole point of the hiring
algorithm is that it will learn to mimic, and thus supplant, past human hiring
recommendations. Insofar as those past human decision-makers were biased,
the algorithm will learn to mimic that bias. Then, discrimination will be
baked into the algorithm’s fundamental perceptions of what makes a quality
hire. Here, affirmative corrections of the human-induced—and machineassimilated—bias may be necessary.96
Big Data Affirmative Action offers a solution. With a Big Data
Affirmative Action policy in place, algorithmic decision-making would have
two stages, involving two separate statistical models. The first model would
provide an initial decision, and a second Big Data Affirmative Action model
would then adjust that initial decision to eliminate any baked-in
discrimination.

92 See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination
in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2018) [hereinafter Kleinberg et al.,
Discrimination]; Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 238 (2018) [hereinafter
Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions].
93 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671 (2016); Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, Fairness
Through Awareness, 2012 PROC. INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONF. 214. The website
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning maintains an archive of dozens of such
studies. Scholarship, FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE LEARNING,
https://www.fatml.org/resources/relevant-scholarship [https://perma.cc/EQM8-VF73].
94 See Salib, supra note 57, at 567–72; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 677–93; Kleinberg et al.,
Discrimination, supra note 92, at 7, 43.
95 See Kleinberg et al., Discrimination, supra note 92, at 28.
96 It might be possible to instead improve the data about post-bail reoffense. But this is difficult.
Police investigation and arrest is the primary way we determine who has committed crimes. Thus,
improving the data would likely entail de-biasing police’s attitudes—a goal we do not currently know
how to accomplish. See supra Section I.B.

846

117:821 (2022)

Big Data Affirmative Action

The initial-decision algorithm could employ any statistical approach the
designer liked. If she prized model interpretability over predictive accuracy,
she could use a simple ordinary least squares regression. If she prized
predictive accuracy over understanding the model’s inner workings, she
could use a cutting-edge deep neural network.97 The model could also have
as many input features as the designer liked, again allowing optimization
between accuracy and interpretability.98
The initial-decision algorithm would digest its inputs, run the numbers,
and output a tentative recommendation. Then the second model—the Big
Data Affirmative Action model—would step in. Big Data Affirmative
Action for algorithmic decisions would work exactly the same as it
would for human decisions. Analyzing the initial-decision algorithm’s inputs
and outputs, the Big Data Affirmative Action model would estimate the
effect of race on those outputs, controlling for other “legitimate” factors.
As with human decisions, the resulting coefficients of discrimination would
be used to program a corrective algorithm. The corrective Big Data
Affirmative Action model would then adjust the initial-decision model’s
recommendation, eliminating unwarranted racial penalties and de-biasing
the algorithm.
Two other scholarly articles have proposed related—but distinct—
statistical approaches to eliminating algorithmic discrimination.99 These
approaches share some features of Big Data Affirmative Action. But there
are differences worth noting. First, the Big Data Affirmative Action
approach is more flexible. It can be applied to correct discrimination by any
kind of algorithm, including noninterpretable “black boxes” like deep neural
networks. By contrast, some of the other proposals work only to correct

97 HASTIE ET AL., supra note 56, at 305–16, 389–414. Generally, as the accuracy of statistical models’
answers goes up, our ability to understand how they got those answers goes down. This is called the
accuracy–interpretability tradeoff. The most accurate algorithms are often described as “black boxes,”
having completely incomprehensible (to humans) decision functions. See Toshiki Mori & Naoshi
Uchihira, Balancing the Trade-Off Between Accuracy and Interpretability in Software Defect Prediction,
24 EMPIRICAL SOFTWARE ENG’G 779, 780 (2019); Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’:
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, 2016 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 4–7.
98 See Aylin Alin, Multicollinearity, 2 WIRES COMPUTATIONAL STAT. 370, 370–71 (2010)
(explaining how the addition of collinear variables reduces a model’s interpretability).
99 See Crystal S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and
Legal Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291, 346–48 (2020); see generally Devin G. Pope & Justin R.
Sydnor, Implementing Anti-Discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models, 3 AM. ECON. J. 206
(2011) (proposing a de-biasing method using a single, interpretable statistical model trained to quantify
and correct the effect of race on a given decision).
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decisions by highly interpretable, but less accurate, algorithms.100 This
advantage of Big Data Affirmative Action will become especially important
as extraordinarily accurate, but radically noninterpretable, algorithms come
to dominate automated decision-making.101
Second, the Big Data Affirmative Action approach does not require—
as others do—ignoring large amounts of data when building the initialdecision algorithm.102 Such systematic exclusion of relevant data can again
reduce accuracy in algorithmic decisions103 and perhaps introduce bias of
its own.104
Finally, certain other proposals do not follow Big Data Affirmative
Action in carefully calibrating their race-based adjustments to correct
only discrimination by a single institution.105 As discussed below, such
localization is crucial for maintaining the legality of any affirmative-actionstyle intervention.106
Big Data Affirmative Action thus represents an improvement on the
extant proposals for de-biasing algorithms. Perhaps more importantly, Big
Data Affirmative Action goes much further. These previous proposals are
100 Professors Yang and Dobbie propose an intervention under which a single prediction model first
estimates coefficients for all relevant variables, including race. Then, when the time comes to make
individual decisions, each individual’s actual race is replaced with a universal dummy value. Thus, the
model corrects for racial discrimination by treating everyone as if they were of the same race. Yang &
Dobbie, supra note 99, at 346–48. This approach, however, depends on the model having accurately
estimated the impact of race on outcomes. Interpretable models, like the ordinary least squares model that
Yang and Dobbie use, are designed to produce such accurate estimates. See Yang & Dobbie, supra note
99, at 336 n.188 (using ordinary least squares regression). But models that prioritize predictive
accuracy—like neural networks, random forests, and even some regressions—do not produce such
estimates. Burrell, supra note 97, at 5–7. Such models ignore the relative contributions of individual
inputs in order to maximize the accuracy of bottom-line outputs. Id. Thus, neither the Yang–Dobbie nor
the related Pope–Sydnor intervention will work to de-bias highly accurate, but less interpretable, models.
101 Relatedly, the Big Data Affirmative Action approach works even in the presence of collinearity
between race and another independent variable. Under the Yang–Dobbie and Pope–Sydnor approaches,
such collinearity could result in an inaccurate weight being assigned to race, and thus, an inaccurate
correction for racial discrimination. See Alin, supra note 98, at 370–71. Under a Big Data Affirmative
Action approach, this can be fixed by leaving the race-correlated variable in the initial decision model but
dropping it from the corrective model. See infra Section IV.F. Yang–Dobbie and Pope–Sydnor use just
one model for both decision and correction. There, dropping the race-correlated variable will again reduce
the accuracy of the model’s outputs.
102 Yang and Dobbie’s second proposal contemplates training the decision algorithm using only data
from members of the favored racial group—generally whites. See Yang & Dobbie, supra note 99, at 349.
103 See id. (noting that Yang and Dobbie’s intervention produces accurate predictions only “if one
believes that bias . . . is not an issue among white[s] . . . and that [their data] is [therefore] . . . accurate”).
104 See Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 386, 386–88 (1983) (describing selection bias).
105 See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions, supra note 92, at 276 (proposing an algorithmic
intervention that, in effect, sets a racial quota for pretrial incarceration).
106 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
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limited to correcting discrimination in algorithmic decisions. By contrast, as
described in this Article, Big Data Affirmative Action is a truly universal
tool. It can be used to correct discrimination in any decision—human,
algorithmic, or otherwise.
III. IS BIG DATA AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LEGAL?
Big Data Affirmative Action’s binding constraint is not likely to be its
practicability. As discussed above, across a range of contexts, the data exist
and the expertise is available to design and implement effective policies.
Instead, the most likely constraints are legal. Essentially any substantial
policy intervention designed to address racial, gender, religious, or related
inequalities will have to grapple with constitutional and statutory
antidiscrimination law. Certain anodyne interventions, like the de-biasing
techniques discussed above, are unlikely to raise serious legal concerns. But
unfortunately, they are also unlikely to do any good for people of color or
other Americans facing discrimination. Big Data Affirmative Action is, by
design, a more muscular intervention, designed to affect the world directly
and to do so explicitly along racial lines. Any intervention like that is sure to
raise complicated questions of legality.
This Part does two things. First, it explains the law bearing on Big Data
Affirmative Action. The central puzzle here is that, despite a long history of
approving affirmative action policies of all kinds, the Supreme Court has
appeared in recent years to take a turn. For the past several decades, the Court
has rejected every single affirmative action policy designed to redress
discrimination that is has reviewed. True, to date the Court has maintained
tentative support for affirmative action in college admissions. But as
explained below, campus affirmative action is somewhat idiosyncratic—
neither intended to combat discrimination nor equipped to do so. Big Data
Affirmative Action and its forebears, by contrast, aim to undo discriminatory
harm by implementing explicit preferences based on race or another
protected characteristic.
This Part shows that the Court’s apparent turn against discriminationredressing affirmative action is just that—apparent. The governing law has
not changed. Then and now, the law has demanded two things of affirmative
action policies: they must be founded on a strong basis in evidence of
remediable discrimination by the implementing institution and be well
tailored to correcting only that discrimination. What changed, as shown
below, were the plans under review. Older plans satisfied these criteria;
newer ones have not. This Part suggests why.
After explaining the legal rules governing affirmative action, and the
cases applying them, this Part shows why Big Data Affirmative Action
849

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

would pass muster. Unlike the policies that the Supreme Court has recently
rejected, Big Data Affirmative Action is, by design, empirically robust and
carefully tailored. Big Data Affirmative Action’s statistical approach to
proving and remedying discrimination does differ somewhat from the
methods used by plans that the Supreme Court has approved. But insofar as
it is different, Big Data Affirmative Action’s approach conforms better to
current legal constraints. Thus, there is every reason to believe that Big Data
Affirmative Action would be legal. Indeed, the approach is so strong that the
Court has already effectively endorsed it—albeit implicitly.
Before proceeding, let us pause for a brief note on methodology. The
following Section is about what the law requires and why Big Data
Affirmative Action satisfies it. Ardent legal realists may be skeptical that
legal analysis matters at all in this arena. Perhaps the Supreme Court is
simply a conservative institution whose legal opinions serve merely as
pretext to reject affirmative action of all kinds.
There are three arguments against this pessimistic view. First, it does
not fit very well with the Court’s actual decisions. The Court could easily
outlaw affirmative action, reciting colorable legal arguments, and be done
with it. Yet it hasn’t. Even as it has invalidated particular policies, it
continues to vociferously reaffirm their legal permissibility in theory.
Second, even if the Court does have policy views about affirmative action—
and it surely does—it often exercises its prerogative to write those into the
law. As discussed below, the strong basis in evidence rule reflects a small-c
conservative approach to redressing discrimination. It treats discrimination
as wrong and illegal but is wary of interventions that would invite rapid,
uncontrolled societal change. Thus, in this case, a policy that complies with
the law ought to therefore be acceptable even to conservative Justices.
Finally, even if the case law in this area were a mere smokescreen to obscure
the Court’s pure political decisions, analyses like the one below would
expose it. If, as argued here, Big Data Affirmative Action assiduously
complies with the Court’s stated rules, a stubborn rejection of the policy
would reveal the charade.
A. The Law of Affirmative Action
There are facially compelling reasons for skepticism about Big Data
Affirmative Action’s legality. Notably, in the last thirty years, the Supreme
Court has consistently struck down similarly structured policies.107 That is, it
has rejected affirmative action policies under which race—or another

107 This trend began with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See also infra
Section III.A.3 (discussing later cases).
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protected characteristic—was a decisive factor in allocating some benefit.
These recent decisions stand in stark contrast to the previous thirty years,
when the Supreme Court upheld many such plans.
What changed? There are two possibilities. The first—endorsed by
certain dissenting Justices,108 legal scholars,109 and policymakers110—is
that the Court changed its mind about the law. Under this view, the
earlier decisions endorsing certain discrimination-redressing, race-based
preferences should be understood as functionally overruled. If that is right,
essentially all affirmative action plans of that kind—including Big Data
Affirmative Action—are now forbidden. The second possibility is that the
world has changed. Specifically, it has changed in some way that made it
harder to design affirmative action policies that comply with the law. If this
is true, then there is hope that a fresh approach—like Big Data Affirmative
Action—would be upheld as legal.
The second view is the correct one. The Supreme Court has never
overruled its cases endorsing certain discrimination-redressing racial
preferences. On the contrary, even as it has recently rejected certain specific
affirmative action plans, it has simultaneously insisted that they are not
generally forbidden. The subsequent Sections trace the case law’s history,
excavate a single, consistently applied legal standard, and explain why—
despite that unchanging standard—the Court has lately appeared to turn
against affirmative action.
1. A Note on Campus Affirmative Action
Before trying to understand the case law governing Big Data
Affirmative Action, let us pause momentarily to sort out the cases that do not
govern it. Today, the term “affirmative action” most readily conjures images
of elite colleges, where the war over race-conscious admissions runs hot. As
recently as 2016, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin reaffirmed colleges’ ability to consider race in admissions.111
Nevertheless, anti-affirmative-action activists almost immediately sued
108 Croson, 488 U.S. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “decision mark[ed] a
deliberate and giant step backward in this Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence”).
109 See, e.g., Anderson C. Williams, Is Affirmative Action Dead? The Meaning of Adarand
Constructors, 19 W.J. BLACK STUD. 254, 254 (1995) (“[M]any critics of affirmative action have argued
that the Adarand decision sounded the death knell of affirmative action.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1612
(1990) (“Croson culminated the Court’s long-mounting trend toward limiting the justification for
affirmative action . . . .”).
110 See, e.g., Kevin Merida & Kenneth J. Cooper, Alarmed by High Court Rulings, Black Leaders
Prepare for Action, WASH. POST, July 3, 1995, at A1; 141 CONG. REC. S8530 (daily ed. June 16, 1995)
(statement of Sen. McConnell).
111 579 U.S. 365, 388 (2016).
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Harvard University over its admissions policy.112 The Court has now granted
certiorari in that case, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and
Fellows of Harvard College,113 perhaps signaling its readiness to work a
major change in the law. Indeed, the Court may now be ready to deliver on
a thirty-year-old promise to eventually overrule its earlier cases and make
traditional campus affirmative action illegal.114
But campus affirmative action—and the law governing it—is in many
ways sui generis. First, the legal justification for race-based decision-making
is unique. In college admissions, race-based considerations are permitted in
service of the “compelling interest” of “obtaining ‘the educational benefits
that flow from student body diversity.’”115 According to the Court, these
benefits include things like “promot[ing] cross-racial understanding, . . .
break[ing] down racial stereotypes, . . . promot[ing] learning outcomes, and
better prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and
society.”116
Big Data Affirmative Action and its forebears, by contrast, are not
about promoting the socially diffuse benefits of diversity. They are about
remedying the specific harms of discrimination.
This distinction—between different justifications for race-conscious
decision-making—gives rise to a second important distinction. In college
admissions, race may never constitute an “automatic” or “decisive” reason
to admit one applicant over another.117 As the Court said in Gratz v.
Bollinger, university therefore may not, for example, assign a fixed number
of “points to every single applicant from an ‘underrepresented minority’
group” when point totals determine admissions decisions.118 Instead, race
may be considered only as one among many nondecisive attributes, in a
“holistic review of each applicant’s file.”119 Under this legal regime, college
affirmative action programs are allowed only if “race is but a ‘factor of a

112

See generally Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting the plaintiff’s allegation that Harvard College’s undergraduate
admissions process violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).
113 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
114 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
115 Fisher, 579 U.S. at 381 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013)); see
also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
116 Fisher, 579 U.S. at 381 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
117 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003).
118 Id. at 271.
119 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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factor of a factor’” in the admissions decision.120 By contrast, under Big Data
Affirmative Action—and its historical forebears, discussed below—race is
the decisive factor for allocating benefits.
Given these important differences, the remainder of this Article largely
sets aside college-based “diversity-justified” affirmative action. Instead, it
focuses on “discrimination-remediating” affirmative action. That is, it uses
the term “affirmative action” to refer to policies under which race is a
decisive reason to allocate some benefit, with the goal of redressing
discrimination. This is not to say that the two kinds of affirmative action
share nothing in common. In both cases, the law’s conceptual structure is the
same: an affirmative action policy must be aimed at achieving some
legitimate end, and the policy must be well tailored to that end. But different
ends authorize different means. The following Sections therefore focus on
policies—and the law governing them—that share Big Data Affirmative
Action’s ends.
These two varieties of affirmative action have one more thing in
common: they are potential substitutes. As already noted, the Supreme Court
may be poised to outlaw diversity-justified campus-based affirmative action.
Suppose that is the ultimate result of the Harvard litigation. The question
then becomes: What will college administrators concerned about the
underrepresentation of minority students on their campuses be able to do
about it?
The answer is Big Data Affirmative Action. Deprived of diversitypromoting affirmative action as an option, admissions offices will have to
resort to discrimination-remediating affirmative action. Of course, the
availability of discrimination-remediating affirmative action will depend on
first documenting discrimination in the admissions process.121 But if such
discrimination is documented, Big Data Affirmative Action is—as argued
herein—the optimal approach for remedying it. Thus, if the Supreme Court

120

Fisher, 579 U.S. at 375 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608
(W.D. Tex. 2009)). This doctrine suffers from the drawback of incoherence—suggesting that race may
be used in admissions only if it does not matter. The most charitable reading of Gratz might be that it
does not flatly forbid the “decisive” use of race, nor an allocation of “points” to members of a particular
racial group. Rather, the problem in that case was that the point bonus was too big. See Gratz, 539 U.S.
at 270. But this view is in significant tension with much of Gratz’s language. See, e.g., id. at 270–71
(“[P]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake.” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978))).
121 This will be complicated if the prior status quo included affirmative action that benefitted groups
who would otherwise be discriminated against. Thus, any new implementation of affirmative action may
involve an initial fact-gathering stage, in which admissions outcomes are observed absent any affirmative
action intervention.
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does indeed outlaw diversity-promoting campus affirmative action, Big Data
Affirmative Action will become all the more important as a policy design.122
2. The Golden Age of Affirmative Action
In 1979, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Supreme
Court upheld Kaiser Aluminum’s contract with the United Steelworkers of
America.123 Under that agreement, Kaiser would reserve 50% of the seats in
its craftwork training program for Black applicants, and it would hire its new
craftworkers from that program. This would continue until the proportion of
Black craftworkers at Kaiser’s plant equaled that of the surrounding
community.124
The Court held that this plan was allowed, despite Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . race.”125 Title VII, the Court
reasoned, did not “condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action plans.”126 On the contrary, the statute was designed to
eradicate workplace discrimination. Kaiser and the USWA’s plan aimed at
just that—“eliminat[ing] traditional patterns of racial segregation” in
Kaiser’s industry.127
There was ample evidence of discrimination to eliminate. The Court
cited a half dozen legal decisions, along with federal government reports and
academic studies, documenting race-based exclusion from craftwork. In fact,
the Court thought discrimination in these trades to be so well established that
it was a proper subject of judicial notice.128
Such evidence of discrimination, however, did not empower Kaiser and
the USWA to impose whatever affirmative action plan they pleased. Their
actual plan was permissible only because it was tailored to remedying the
evident discrimination at hand. As the Court said, the plan would “open
employment opportunities . . . which ha[d] traditionally been closed to”
Black workers.129 But it would not go beyond remedying discrimination to
“unnecessarily trammel the interests of . . . white employees.”130 And the

122 Note, however, that since diversity-justified and discrimination-remediating affirmative action
are not identical, they are not perfect substitutes. Thus, there are important questions to be answered
about which groups would benefit in relative terms should admissions decisions shift from the former to
the latter.
123 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
124 Id. at 197, 199.
125
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
126 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
127 Id. at 201.
128 Id. at 198 n.1.
129 Id. at 208.
130 Id.
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Court emphasized that the plan would be in place only long enough to
“eliminate [the] manifest racial imbalance.”131
Similar logic had driven the Court’s decision in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, decided eight years before Weber.132
There, the Court upheld a plan133 under which Black children would be—
based on their race—bused to white schools.134 This policy was part of the
United States’ years-long effort to remedy school segregation in the wake of
Brown v. Board of Education.135
As with Weber, in Swann there was ample evidence of discrimination
to remedy. This was in some sense obvious. In Charlotte, as in many parts of
the country, school segregation had once been written explicitly into law.136
But even so, the Swann Court strongly emphasized the district court’s
“numerous hearings” and “voluminous evidence” showing that, even after
Brown, school segregation in Charlotte was the product of discrimination.137
The Court emphasized this Charlotte-specific evidence because it did
not believe affirmative action programs were legal when designed to address
“de facto segregation.”138 That is, such policies could not attempt to correct
a mere “racial imbalance” without evidence that it was “brought about by
discriminatory action.”139 Nor would a busing plan be permitted if designed
to undo “all the problems of racial prejudice.”140 Only problems of prejudice
in Charlotte of which there was adequate evidence could be targeted.
As with Weber, the Swann Court emphasized the affirmative action
plan’s tailoring to the problem of intentional segregation in Charlotte. The

131

Id.
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
133 Astute observers of antidiscrimination law may object that Swann did not really involve an
affirmative action plan. Unlike in Weber, Swann’s school busing program was not voluntarily adopted by
a party to the case but was instead imposed by a district court. Id. at 10. That is half true. The district
court did impose a mandatory desegregation scheme, but that is only because the school board failed to
adopt a voluntary one. Id. at 6–10. The board could have adopted a voluntary one, and in fact the Supreme
Court emphasized that the district had greater leeway to do so than the courts. Id. at 16. That is, the power
of institutions to voluntarily institute race-based preferences to remedy discrimination is broader than the
power of courts to impose such remedies. Nevertheless, Swann does blur the line between what we usually
call affirmative action and what we call a judicial remedy. As discussed below, the symmetries and
asymmetries between these two conceptual categories—and the gray area separating them—in fact
supports Big Data Affirmative Action’s legality. See infra Section III.B.
134 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 9.
135
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 7.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 17.
139 Id. at 17–18.
140 Id. at 23.
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plan set targets for racial composition within schools.141 But, recognizing that
not all of the raw imbalance could be attributed to discrimination, the plan
treated those targets as “a starting point . . . rather than an inflexible
requirement.”142 For similar reasons, the plan called for “close scrutiny,”
though not automatic condemnation, of every “one-race” school.143
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court upheld a diverse collection of
affirmative action programs across a number of domains. In Fullilove v.
Klutznick, the Court approved a plan to reserve 10% of federal public-works
funds to be spent contracting with minority-owned businesses.144 Crucial to
this approval were Congress’s findings that minorities’ underrepresentation
in government construction work was caused by the government’s own
discrimination. A congressional report found that such underrepresentation
was “not the result of random chance.”145 Instead, “[w]ith specific reference
to Government construction contracting,” Congress found that “the practices
of some agencies preclude[d]” minority participation.146 The spending
set-asides were also tailored specifically to address just the identified
government discrimination. The plan was subject to waivers, creating a
defeasible “assumption” that “‘adjustment for the effects of past
discrimination’ would assure that at least 10% of the funds from the federal
grant program would flow to minority businesses.”147 If, however, racial
disparities on certain projects were not caused by congressional
discrimination—but instead a lack of qualified contractors—the 10%
requirement could be waived. “[W]ithout this fine tuning to remedial
purpose,” the Court later remarked, “the statute would not have ‘passed
muster.’”148
Two other cases, both decided in 1987, are also worth highlighting:
Johnson v. Transportation Agency149 and United States v. Paradise.150 Both
cases involved affirmative action employment plans for the promotion of
disadvantaged minorities. The plan in Paradise required that 50% of the
promotions in a police department go to Black officers, conditional on
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See id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
143 Id. at 25–26.
144 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).
145 Id. at 465 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-468, at 2 (1975)).
146 Id. at 466 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-468, at 29).
147 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488–89 (1989) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 487–88).
148 Id. at 489 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S.at 487).
149 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
150 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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qualified applicants being available.151 Johnson’s plan imposed no numerical
ratio but authorized race and sex as decisive reasons to promote one
employee over another.152 In both cases, promotion was allowed even when
Black or female employees had, for example, scored lower on competency
tests than their white or male counterparts.153
Both affirmative action plans were promulgated to redress welldocumented discrimination by the implementing employers. In Paradise, the
Court’s principal opinion proclaimed, “[I]t cannot be gainsaid that white
troopers promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an official
policy which systematically excluded all blacks.”154 The result was that,
among nearly 200 upper-level officers, the department had zero Black
majors, captains, lieutenants, or sergeants.155 It had just four Black
corporals.156 In Johnson, likewise, the Court agreed that the transportation
agency had offered “‘limited opportunities . . . in the past’ . . . for women to
find employment in certain job classifications.”157 As a result, among 238
skilled craftworkers, none were women.158
As in the earlier cases, the plans in Johnson and Paradise were tailored
to address the employers’ discrimination without going further.159 Neither
mandated gender- or race-balanced quotas in the workforce. Both made their
hiring preferences conditional on the availability of qualified candidates
who would be evaluated against white and male applicants along numerous
dimensions.160 That is, if external factors made well-qualified Black or
female candidates scarce, the policy would not apply. Furthermore, both
policies were designed to terminate once discrimination was eradicated from
promotion decisions.161
These five cases—Weber, Fullilove, Swann, Johnson, and Paradise—
are not the only ones in which the Court blessed affirmative action policies.162
But they are illustrative. As will be discussed, each has an echo in the
subsequent era—a later, facially similar plan that the Court rejected. Thus, a
151

Id. at 163.
480 U.S. at 622.
153 Id. at 623–24; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 160–62.
154 480 U.S. at 170 (alteration in original) (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1533 n.16
(11th Cir. 1985)).
155 Id. at 163.
156 Id.
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480 U.S. at 634.
158 Id. at 636.
159 Id. at 637; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 185–86.
160 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 636–38; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 177–79.
161 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639–40; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178.
162 See, e.g., Loc. 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
152

857

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

careful comparison of the Court’s reasoning in each of these approval–
rejection dyads can illustrate what the law requires of affirmative action
policies. And it can reveal how those requirements have—or have not—
changed.
3.

A Turning Tide: Wygant and the Strong Basis in Evidence
Standard
It is tempting to view Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education as marking
a turning point against affirmative action in the case law. There, the Court
invalidated a teachers’ union bargaining agreement that included race-based
protections against layoffs.163
Wygant is significant not because it was the first case to invalidate an
affirmative action policy. It wasn’t.164 But Wygant crystalized for the first
time a single legal standard under which affirmative action policies could be
evaluated. In the earlier cases discussed above, the Court’s statements of
legal principle ranged from hazy to evasive.
The principal opinion in Wygant laid down two requirements for
promulgating an affirmative action policy: First, the implementing
institution must “ha[ve] a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action [i]s necessary.”165 That evidence could not be of “societal
discrimination alone,” but rather must include a “showing of prior
discrimination by the [institution] involved.”166 Second, the policy must be
“limited and properly tailored . . . to cure the effects of [that] prior
discrimination.”167 That is, an institution may clean up its own discriminatory
mess, but no one else’s.
Wygant’s strong basis in evidence rule enshrines a compromise
between ambitious progressive reformism and small-c conservatism.
Progressives concerned with eradicating social injustice might prefer that
affirmative action be much more aggressive. Perhaps employers ought to be
allowed to confer large advantages to all workers from historically
disadvantaged groups, irrespective of who discriminated, when, and how
much. However, conservatives would object to that strategy, even if they
agreed that discrimination was real and wrong. Their objection might go
thus: The cumulative effects of such aggressive affirmative action—many
employers conferring many advantages—would go too far too fast.
163

476 U.S. 267, 270 (1986).
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
165 476 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). Wygant produced no majority opinion. But in subsequent
years, the Supreme Court adopted the strong basis in evidence standard from Justice Powell’s principal
opinion as authoritative. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989).
166 476 U.S. at 274.
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Untethered from particular instances of discrimination, the net result could
be a kind of “double recovery,” by which the total quantum of remedy
exceeded the quantum of harm. Another concern, raised by Justice O’Connor
in a different case, is that unconstrained affirmative action might invite
private actors to engage in “outright racial balancing.”168 Such balancing, in
the conservative view, simply replaces one kind of discrimination (against
historically disadvantaged groups) with another (against historically
advantaged groups).
The strong basis in evidence rule, as concretized in Wygant, represents
a middle path. It treats discrimination as real, wrong, and illegal and endorses
affirmative action as a widely available, nonjudicial remedy. But it
authorizes the remedy only in response to—and congruent with—evinced
discrimination by the implementing institution. This blunts the doublerecovery and racial-balancing objections. The result is a legal test that
responds to progressive concerns but does so in a way that conservatives can,
and should, accept.
Beyond crystalizing the strong basis in evidence rule, Wygant was also
perhaps significant for a second reason. It foreshadowed an era in which the
Court has consistently rejected affirmative action policies—despite having
previously approved facially identical ones. The plan at issue in Wygant
looked very much like that of Weber. Both afforded employment preferences
to members of disadvantaged racial groups. Yet, in contrast to the Weber
Court, the Wygant Court rejected the affirmative action policy under review
as impermissible under its newly articulated rule.
In the intervening decades, this story repeated itself over and over. Time
after time, the Court has struck down affirmative action policies that looked,
at first blush, very much like ones it had previously upheld. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court invalidated the city of Richmond’s
law setting aside 30% of government construction spending for minorityowned businesses.169 This despite the law’s facial similarity to the set-aside
approved in Fullilove. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, the Court forbade Seattle’s use of race in assigning
students to public schools.170 Yet it had allowed just that in Swann. And in
Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court disapproved a fire department’s promotion of
minority firefighters over white firefighters who scored higher on a
qualifying exam.171 Yet it had permitted both race and sex to trump test scores
in Paradise and Johnson, respectively.
168
169
170
171
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4. New Law or New Facts?
What happened after Wygant? There are two possibilities. The first is
that Wygant did not merely formalize a previously inchoate legal standard
for evaluating affirmative action plans. Instead, it changed the law. Perhaps
it raised the standard substantially, so that going forward, few plans could
survive. Maybe it did something even more dramatic, overruling earlier cases
and, sub silentio, outlawing affirmative action entirely.
These views have some undeniable appeal, especially in light of the
Court’s apparent inconsistency in upholding and striking down facially
similar policies. It is no surprise then that, with mounting emphasis after each
adverse Supreme Court decision, academics and other court watchers have
repeatedly declared the death of affirmative action in America.172 Moreover,
one thing is indisputable: when the Court has recently struck down
affirmative action plans, it has predictably relied on Wygant.173
There is, however, another explanation for the Court’s apparent aboutface on affirmative action. This explanation sounds not in law, but in fact.
Perhaps Wygant really did just clarify—not change—the legal test for
affirmative action. Maybe, then, it is a mere coincidence that affirmative
action plans recently started failing the test despite facial similarity to plans
that had passed it.
There are three reasons to think this latter view is the correct one. First,
the Court has said over and over that affirmative action is still allowed.
Second, the consistent-rule theory makes sense of what would otherwise be
an inexplicable timeline of case law. Third—and most important—a careful
reading of the cases reveals why, even under a consistent legal standard,
some affirmative action plans passed muster while other similar plans failed.
Begin with what the Court keeps saying. As recently as Ricci—decided
in 2009—the Court reaffirmed, “The [strong basis in evidence] standard
leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary [antidiscrimination] efforts.”174
This includes “discretion in making race-based decisions”—that is,
affirmative action.175 Likewise, in Parents Involved (decided in 2007),
Justice Roberts declaimed that “no one questions that the obligation to”
redress discrimination in schooling “can include race-conscious remedies—
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See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (noting the Court’s “continued adherence to the standard of
review employed in Wygant”); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582–83 (discussing the Wygant plurality before applying
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whether or not a court had issued an order to that effect.”176 According to the
Court, then, neither Wygant nor any other case has rendered affirmative
action literally or functionally illegal. It remains permissible today.
Second, the timeline. Certainly, the Court’s longest dry spell in
approving affirmative action took place after Wygant. But not immediately
after. Johnson and Paradise were both decided the year following Wygant.
Both of those cases grappled with Wygant’s rejection of an affirmative action
plan,177 but both Courts determined that the particular plans before them were
permissible. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Johnson, in fact, was
devoted entirely to illustrating uniformity in the Court’s reasoning from
Wygant back to Weber.178 The Johnson majority, too, conducted itself as if
the rule had not changed, acknowledging Wygant but then relying on Weber
for the relevant rule.179 Instead, it was not until Croson—decided two years
after both Paradise and Johnson—that the Court kicked off its decades-long
rejection streak.180
Moreover, even before Wygant, the court had been in the business of
rejecting affirmative action plans that resembled plans it had previously
blessed. In Milliken v. Bradley, decided over a decade before Wygant, the
Court rejected a school affirmative action program facially similar to the one
it had approved in Swann.181 All of this undermines the theory that Wygant
or the strong basis in evidence standard propagated a seismic shift in the law
of affirmative action.
If the law has not changed, then the Court’s apparent decades-long
crusade against affirmative action demands another explanation. The most
straightforward story is that the Court believed the plans it invalidated to be
factually distinct, in critical respects, from the ones it upheld. Put simply, the
affirmative action plans the Court upheld—in the Court’s view—satisfied
the strong basis in evidence test. And the ones it struck down did not. Careful
readings of the opinions in each accepted–rejected dyad reveals precisely
this dynamic.
Consider first the pairing of Weber and Wygant. Weber’s affirmative
action plan favoring Black craftworkers came on the heels of “[j]udicial
176

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 737 (2007). While
Parents Involved did not produce a majority opinion, even the famously affirmative-action-skeptical
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.
177 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626–27; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182–83.
178 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647–57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
179 Id. at 627–28 (majority opinion) (“The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be
guided by our decision in Weber.”).
180 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701;
Ricci, 557 U.S. 557.
181 418 U.S. 717, 740–45 (1974).
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findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds . . . so numerous as to
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice.”182 In Wygant, the
situation was precisely reversed. There, too, previous litigation had produced
factual findings about the promulgating institution’s discrimination in hiring.
“This precise issue was litigated in [two previous] suits. Both courts
concluded that any statistical disparities were the result of general societal
discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the [employer].”183 Thus, on
the Court’s view, the Weber plan was premised on evidence that the favored
Black workers faced discrimination by their employer. The Wygant plan
was not.
The Fullilove–Croson dyad turned on the same distinction. In Fullilove,
Congress’s affirmative action plan for federal contracting rested on strong
empirical findings of discrimination by the federal government. Congress
began by amassing evidence of large nationwide disparities between whiteowned and minority-owned businesses in securing government contracts.184
But it did not stop there. Turning to the U.S. government’s own conduct,
Congress identified “the practices of some agencies [that] preclude[d]”
minority-owned businesses from winning federal contracts.185 These
included, among other things, “the exercise of discretion by government
procurement officers to disfavor minority businesses.”186
By contrast, in Croson, the City of Richmond produced no evidence of
its own discrimination. The city identified a gross statistical disparity. But
even this was weak. The disparity was not between government construction
contracts with white-owned businesses and contracts with minority-owned
businesses. Instead, it was between the proportion of contracts with minorityowned businesses and the proportion of the city’s residents who were
minorities.187 This, the Court thought, was not convincing evidence of
discrimination by the city. It could just as easily be evidence of a lack of
qualified minority-owned contractors in the city. That lack, of course, might
also have been caused by discrimination—in education, private hiring,
lending, or elsewhere. But evidence of such broad “societal discrimination
alone”—as opposed to discrimination attributable to the institution
implementing affirmative action—does not suffice in the strong basis
calculus.188 The Court found the same fault with the City’s reliance on
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
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Congress’s findings, from Fullilove, of nationwide discrimination by
governments against minority-owned contractors.189 “In sum, none of the
evidence presented by the city point[ed] to any identified discrimination in
the Richmond construction industry.”190
Furthermore, the Croson plan was poorly tailored compared with the
plan in Fullilove. Recall that in Fullilove, the 10% spending set-aside was
flexible. It could be waived when too few minority-owned businesses were
available or when such businesses’ high prices were not attributable to the
government’s discrimination.191 Such flexibility helped ensure that the
Fullilove plan was sensitive to legitimate differences between contractors
aside from race.192 Croson’s plan was much more rigid. Its 30% quota was
not tied to any careful estimate of how many minority-owned contractors
would be available absent Richmond’s discrimination.193 Nor was there
flexibility to adjust the set-aside as the city learned more about contractor
availability under a nondiscriminatory bid system. “No partial or complete
waiver” was available “other than in exceptional circumstances.”194 The
Court thus saw Richmond’s plan not as a careful remedy for the city’s own
discrimination, but as an exercise in “outright racial balancing.”195
The Court’s other opposing pairs of affirmative action cases follow the
same pattern. In Swann, the City of Charlotte relied on city-specific evidence
of intentional school segregation.196 In contrast, in Parents Involved, one of
two districts “ha[d] not shown that [it was] ever segregated by law.”197 The
other had been segregated, had been subject to a desegregation order, and a
court found that it “ha[d] eliminated the vestiges of its prior segregated
school system.”198
The affirmative action policies in Paradise and Johnson were premised
on evidence that Black–white and female–male workplace disparities were
caused by discriminatory employment policies.199 As such, the employers
were entitled to implement explicit preferences for promoting Black and
female employees, even over similarly situated candidates with modestly
higher test scores.
189
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The fire department in Ricci, too, wished to promote minority officers
over similar white officers with higher test scores.200 But this was not because
of a history of discrimination by the department. It was instead because of a
worry that the test itself was discriminatory. The department’s promotion
exam did produce statistically disparate results.201 But, the Court ruled, there
was overwhelming evidence that the fire department had carefully calibrated
its test to assess important job-related knowledge.202 Thus, the Court held,
the test’s disparate impact was, at most, evidence of a limited supply of
qualified Black and Brown officers.203 Lacking evidence that the department
was remedying its own discrimination, the Court viewed the policy as an
illegal program which could be used to “obtain[] the employer’s preferred
racial balance.”204
In sum, although it has been decades since the Supreme Court has seen
an affirmative action policy that it liked, affirmative action has not been
outlawed. Instead, when the Court has recently struck down plans that
resembled ones it had previously upheld, it has done so because the plans
themselves were, in fact, factually different. The permissible plans were
based on strong evidence that the institution promulgating the plan
discriminated against the plan’s favored group. These plans, further, were
tailored to that evidence, implementing remedies sufficient to overcome the
evinced discrimination, but not more. By contrast, the affirmative action
policies that the Court has struck down were premised on weak empirical
evidence of discrimination. That evidence often suggested, at most, that
someone other than the implementing institution discriminated against a
disfavored group. And of course, plans lacking concrete evidence of
discrimination by the implementing institution cannot, by definition, be
tailored to remedying just that discrimination. Where the quantum of such
discrimination is unknown—or zero—no tailoring is possible.
5. The Era of Quiet(er) Racism
The above analysis of a half century of case law provides only a partial
answer to the central mystery of the Court’s apparent turn against affirmative
action. As argued above, the problem with the plans that the Court struck
down in recent years was that they were not founded on sufficient empirical
evidence of discrimination. But why not? Why has it apparently become

200
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harder in the past 30 years to assemble a strong basis in evidence on which
an affirmative action plan may be based?
Perhaps the world has changed, making the facts more difficult to
unearth. The early affirmative action cases—Swann, Weber, Fullilove, etc.—
were decided during an era of extraordinarily overt racism and equally overt
discrimination. Consider one 1969 case of which the Weber Court took
judicial notice, in which the defendant union conceded in its brief that “[a]ll
[Black applicants] were denied referral [for membership] admittedly because
they were negroes.”205 A union official in another such case admitted that “I
have 125 white men sitting here who have been paying dues in this union for
years and I cannot send out the black ones before . . . them.”206 The prejudice
was out in the open. There was simply no subterfuge.
Or consider schools. Swann was one of a long line of judicial decisions
attempting to implement the promise of Brown. In Brown, of course, the
Supreme Court ordered desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”207 This did
not happen. Instead, people took to the streets in protest, armed mobs tried
to block Black students from entering white schools, and 101 congressmen
signed The Southern Manifesto, denouncing Brown.208
Racism and discrimination do not look like that today—at least not as
often.209 Since the middle of the twentieth century, Americans have steadily
become less willing to openly espouse racist or discriminatory views.
According to the General Social Survey (GSS), between the 1970s and
1990s, public support for whites’ right to segregate neighborhoods fell by
around two-thirds.210 Support for laws prohibiting interracial marriage
followed the same trend. In 2008, about 33% fewer people believed that
homeowners should have the right to discriminate in selling their houses than
believed so in 1972.211 And by the mid-1980s, so few people supported
school segregation that the GSS stopped asking.212
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979); Loc. 53 of the Int’l Ass’n
of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1050 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969). This case notably arose
in the same district court as Weber.
206 United States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters of Am., Loc. 169, 457 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1972).
207 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
208 See Resistance to School Desegregation, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Mar. 1, 2014),
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-resistance-to-school-desegregation/ [https://perma.cc/B6MZQGP5].
209 There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Fausset, supra note 1 (describing white-supremacist
rallies).
210 Lawrence D. Bobo, Camille Z. Charles, Maria Krysan & Alicia D. Simmons, The Real Record
on Racial Attitudes, in SOCIAL TRENDS IN AMERICAN LIFE: FINDINGS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL
SURVEY SINCE 1972, at 47 (Peter V. Marsden ed., 2012).
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These findings do not mean that America today is post-racial or postracist. On the contrary, the same results include double-digit percentages
of Americans supporting every surveyed prejudiced position except
school segregation.213 And as discussed above, actual discrimination—in
employment, healthcare, criminal justice, and more—continues to thrive.
In fact, the GSS reports do not even prove that Americans are any less
racist than they were fifty years ago.214 They simply show that people are
less willing to say that they are racist. This comports with everyday
experience. Today, it is difficult to imagine 101 sitting congresspeople
signing the Southern Manifesto. But power brokers still enact intentionally
discriminatory policies. Consider, for example, the “Muslim ban.”215 It is just
that, today, policymakers feel compelled to use dog whistles to obfuscate
discriminatory motives that they historically might have espoused openly.
Even Donald Trump—not known for rhetorical circumspection—felt
compelled to dress the “Muslim ban” in the facially race- and religionneutral language of national security.216
Here, then, lies the crux of the affirmative action policymaker’s
dilemma, circa 2022. Racial disparities remain pervasive. Thoughtful
policymakers believe these disparities are driven by discrimination. But no
one will admit discrimination anymore. So, as compared with the past,
discrimination is now harder to prove. And as a result, the strong basis in
evidence required to promulgate an affirmative action policy has become
more difficult to assemble.
This model can explain the apparent disjunction between cases like
Weber, Swann, and Fullilove and cases like Wygant, Parents Involved, and
Croson. In all of these cases, policymakers presented substantial evidence of
gross statistical disparities between advantaged and disadvantaged groups.
But raw disparities, on their own, never constitute a strong basis in evidence.
As discussed above, such raw disparities can either be caused by an
implementing institution’s discrimination or by other factors like broad
societal discrimination.
In the early years, casual, overt, and often de jure racism filled
this evidentiary gap. Then, policymakers had evidence of both statistical
disparities and overt discriminatory acts designed to produce them.
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Id.
They might be. Or maybe not. Self-report is, at best, a noisy proxy for socially and legally
forbidden attitudes.
215 See Declan Walsh, Barred from U.S. Under Trump, Muslims Exult in Biden’s Open Door, N.Y.
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Together, these provided a strong basis in evidence of localized
discriminatory harm.
In the later years, however, institutions promulgating affirmative action
policies lacked the evidence of overt discriminatory intent. Lacking such
evidence, would-be affirmative action policymakers are again stuck only
with gross statistical disparities. Without more, the resulting policies failed
the strong basis in evidence test and were struck down.
B. Why Big Data Affirmative Action Passes Muster
As discussed above, the strong basis in evidence rule, as articulated in
Wygant, requires two things:217 First, affirmative action must be based on
evidence that there is in fact a discriminatory harm to be remedied.218 That
harm must flow from the institution promulgating the plan—as opposed to
another institution or society as a whole.219 Second, the plan must be “limited
and properly tailored . . . to cure the effects of [that] prior discrimination.”220
That is, the plan’s explicit race-based preferences must not be substantially
larger than necessary to counteract the institution’s documented race-based
penalties.
Big Data Affirmative Action policies would, by their very design, do
both. Indeed, they would not merely satisfy these dual requirements; they
would do so substantially better than the affirmative action policies that the
Supreme Court has previously blessed.
Begin with the first requirement—evidence of discrimination by the
implementing institution. As described above, Big Data Affirmative
Action’s approach here would generally be statistical.221 Policy designers
would rely on rich datasets about the people—employees, criminal

217 The Supreme Court has occasionally found itself confused as to how many tests there are for
evaluating affirmative action. Is it just one—the strong basis in evidence rule—or are there two standards:
one statutory and one constitutional? See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (purporting
to decide a statutory, but not a constitutional, question). There is just one. For example, both Ricci (a
statutory case) and Croson (a constitutional case) applied the same strong basis in evidence test. True, in
constitutional cases, the Court sometimes speaks in terms of transsubstantive tiers of scrutiny. But rightly
understood, the strong basis in evidence standard is just a concrete way of cashing out strict scrutiny in
the affirmative action context. Cf. Peter N. Salib, The Pigouvian Constitution, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081,
1111–13 (2021) (describing other concretizations of tiered scrutiny tests).
218 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
219 Id. at 274.
220 Id. at 281 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)).
221 Randomized experimental approaches might also be appropriate for some applications. For
example, a company wishing to eliminate discrimination in interview requests based on written
applications could follow the designs of the resume experiments discussed above. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
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defendants, students, or others—to whom the policy would apply.222 These
datasets would catalog the attributes of those people that might have factored
into the target outcomes—hiring, salary, sentence, admission. Such
cataloged attributes would include both “legitimate” drivers of disparities—
experience, criminal history, SAT scores—and illegitimate drivers of
disparities—race, gender, religion. Statistical analysis—like regression
models—would then be used to determine which inputs drove outcomes, and
to what extent.
This kind of modeling draws precisely the distinction that the law
requires. The statistical controls hold constant all of the most plausible
“legitimate” factors—that is, factors other than the implementing
institution’s discrimination. Differences driven by such factors are taken as
given at the locus of an employer, court, or hospital implementing an
affirmative action plan. And once these plausible “legitimate” explanations
are accounted for, if a race-correlated gap remains, this is strong evidence
that discrimination by the institution under examination is its cause.
How does this statistical approach to evincing discrimination compare
with the evidence that the Court has historically approved? The statistical
approach is fundamentally eliminative, ruling out plausible stories until only
one remains. Most of the approved evidence in the case law, however, has
been additive. On top of gross racial disparities, policymakers offered
additional evidence of racial animus. The presence of some discriminatory
intent supported an inference that gross racial disparities were actually
caused by the institution’s discrimination.
Which approach produces stronger empirical evidence of an
institution’s discrimination? Admittedly, the kind of statistical modelling
underpinning Big Data Affirmative Action cannot eliminate every
conceivable nondiscriminatory explanation for a given racial disparity. It is
always logically possible—if often improbable—that, even after controlling
for every “legitimate” factor one can imagine, the residual disparities had
some other, yet-unimagined cause. There will always be unknown
unknowns.
The direct evidence of discriminatory intent that the Supreme Court
approved in cases like Weber, Swann, Fullilove, Johnson, and Paradise may,
at first glance, seem stronger. Such evidence counts for something, to be
sure. But it is not everything. And it suffers from its own serious epistemic
limitations.
First, in these cases, there was often an evidentiary mismatch between
the alleged discriminator and evidence of discrimination. Consider again the
222
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open admissions of racial animus of which the Weber Court took judicial
notice. These admissions were from previous court cases, involving officials
from unions other than the United Steelworkers.223 Those unions, in fact, had
nothing to do with the case. True, all were craftwork unions. And true, some
of the cited conduct arose, like in Weber, in Louisiana.224 And true, the
evidence of explicit racism in many white Southern unions was voluminous.
But none of this amounts to a smoking-gun admission that Kaiser or the local
United Steelworkers themselves acted with discriminatory intent. Indeed, the
mere fact that this union, among all unions in mid-century Louisiana, wished
to implement affirmative action suggests the opposite.
Even if the United Steelworkers did intend to discriminate, it would not
logically follow that they succeeded. Perhaps in Weber, as in other
affirmative action cases, there was a general shortage of qualified Black
workers in the craftwork industry.225 This is eminently plausible, since the
widespread, judicially noted Southern racism in craftwork unions would
likely have deterred Black workers from that career path. Under such
conditions, even a completely nondiscriminatory union would hire out many
more white workers than Black ones. Perhaps this dynamic explained some
or all of the gross racial disparities identified in Weber.
Thus, the older, facially more straightforward approach to establishing
a strong basis in evidence of discrimination produces its own uncertainty.
Weber and related cases therefore show that absolute certainty is not
required. A strong basis in evidence consists of defensible—if imperfect—
empirical inferences.
Big Data Affirmative Action likewise rests on such inferences. It is
always possible, in theory, that some “legitimate” factor not accounted for
in a model—rather than discrimination—explains some racial disparity. But
when in sentencing, for example, actual criminal conduct, a defendant’s
criminal history, the presence of multiple defendants, differences in
attorneys, education, age, geography, income, and employment cannot
explain racial disparities,226 how likely does an alternate “legitimate”
explanation seem? Surely not more likely than the possibility that
widespread Southern racism against Black craftworkers, as opposed to
discrimination by a particular employer and union, caused a racial disparity
in hiring.
This point can be made even more strongly: Statistical evidence is
simply evidence. For proof that the law of affirmative action accepts this
223
224
225
226

See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text.
See supra note 205.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587–88 (2009).
See supra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
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equivalence, one needs to look no further than to its sibling, civil
antidiscrimination law. In many antidiscrimination lawsuits, a plaintiff may
win by providing proof a policy’s statistical “disparate impact.”227 The
statistical models used there are almost identical to the models that would
underpin Big Data Affirmative Action. They proceed by showing that,
controlling for plausible “legitimate” factors, a given policy produces
unequal results along protected lines.228
If there were ever any doubt that this style of statistical proof could
adequately support affirmative action, the Ricci Court put it to rest. There,
the Court held, employers have “discretion in making race-based decisions”
when “there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.”229
That is, just as statistical evidence of discrimination can support civil
liability, so too can it authorize affirmative action. Given all of this, there can
be little doubt that Big Data Affirmative Action’s statistical models can
satisfy the empirical element of the strong basis in evidence rule.
What about the second element of a strong basis in evidence—
tailoring? Here, Big Data Affirmative Action quite clearly fares better than
even the best policies that the Court has previously approved. In early cases,
the tailoring that the Court blessed was embarrassingly shoddy. In Weber,
for example, the Court approved a set-aside of 50% of training opportunities,
to be maintained until the proportion of Black craftworkers and local Black
population were equalized.230 The 50% figure was apparently arbitrary. It
certainly was not based on any prediction of what the discrimination-free
labor composition would have been. On the contrary, the populationequalization metric implicitly attributed the entire Black–white craftworker
disparity at Kaiser to Kaiser’s discrimination. It is difficult to imagine,
however, that other factors—like pervasive racism in other unions or midcentury Louisiana more broadly—did not cause at least some of the Black–
white disparity at Kaiser.
Other policies, like the one in Fullilove, were more sophisticated. Recall
that Fullilove’s 10% spending set-aside for minority-owned contractors was
subject to waivers.231 If, for a given project, there simply were not enough of
such contractors who could do the needed work, the funds needed not be
spent.232 The same rule applied if certain minority-owned contractors charged
227 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545–
46 (2015) (affirming the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act).
228 See Salib, supra note 57, at 528–29.
229 557 U.S. at 583.
230 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
231 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 487–88 (1980).
232 Id. at 488.
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extreme prices not attributable to past discrimination.233 Via these waivers,
the Fullilove plan tailored itself, at least roughly, to remedying just the
effects federal government’s own discrimination in contracting.
Even this is pretty clunky. How, for example, could government
officials determine that high prices were or were not caused by past
discrimination? They were certainly not performing complex scholarly
studies of each contractor’s history and cost structure. Likely, officials would
simply listen to a given contractor’s story and trust their gut. This approach
is imprecise and thus likely to produce an affirmative-action remedy either
substantially too big or too small to address the targeted discrimination.
Big Data Affirmative Action policies would be much better tailored.
That is because Big Data Affirmative Action’s statistical models measure
both the presence and the quantum of discrimination. Knowing the quantum
of discriminatory harm, Big Data Affirmative Action policymakers can
easily tailor their remedies. If a court discriminatorily imposes an additional
seven months’ incarceration on Black defendants, then the Big Data
Affirmative Action adjustment is simply seven fewer months. If Google
discriminates in salary against Hispanic engineers to the tune of $10,000 per
year, then the Big Data Affirmative Action adjustment is $10,000 more. And
so on. The measured harm and the remedy are precise inverses of one
another. No ex-post fact-finding or gut-trusting is needed.
Thus, under both prongs of the strong basis in evidence standard, Big
Data Affirmative Action performs at least as well as—and often much better
than—policies that the Court has already approved. Big Data Affirmative
Action is therefore not merely an evolution of, but an improvement on, oldfashioned affirmative action along every legally operative dimension.
C. A Goldilocks Problem
Before moving to normative puzzles for Big Data Affirmative Action,
let us pause to consider a yet-unresolved legal one: The law requires that
affirmative action plans be based on “strong” evidence that the promulgating
institution discriminated. But how strong, exactly? Strong evidence of
discrimination, in addition to enabling affirmative action, can of course also
trigger civil liability under antidiscrimination laws like Title VII.
This seems like a tricky situation. Institutions wishing to implement
affirmative action policies—including the Big Data variety—must, on the
one hand, compile evidence that they discriminated. Otherwise, their
233 Id. To see how discrimination could raise prices for some contractors, consider a white contractor
who, through preferential treatment, secured enormous amounts of government work. This could lead to
economies of scale and lower costs for that company, resulting in comparatively higher prices for
minority-owned businesses.
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affirmative action policies will themselves constitute illegal discrimination.
On the other hand, if the evidence of discrimination is too convincing, it
seems like that too will raise the specter of liability. The trick then, as with
Goldilocks and the bears, is to compile evidence of one’s own discrimination
that is neither too hot nor too cold, but just right.
How hard is it to navigate this dilemma? That depends on the space
between the two operative legal standards. If there were no daylight between
the evidence constituting a strong basis and the evidence triggering liability
for antidiscrimination violations, the balancing act would be difficult,
indeed. Then, no right-thinking institution would ever undertake to correct
its own discrimination via affirmative action.
This would be a bad situation. Happily, it is not the situation we have—
at least not when Big Data Affirmative Action is on the table. First, not all
antidiscrimination laws could even potentially threaten promulgators of Big
Data Affirmative Action plans with liability. Certain statutes, like Title VII,
do allow plaintiffs to prove their claims via statistical proof—the disparate
impact approach.234 Here, the statistical models undergirding Big Data
Affirmative Action could, at least in theory, be repurposed as weapons
against the policies’ designers. But under other antidiscrimination laws, like
the Equal Protection Clause, disparate impact proof is not sufficient on its
own to prove discrimination.235
Nevertheless, many statutes allow statistical proof, and those statutes
have a wide reach.236 Here, the Supreme Court is aware of the potential
Goldilocks problem. It has insisted assiduously that the gap between
affirmative action’s minimum evidence rule and statutory thresholds for
liability is wide enough to be navigable. Title VII is again the exemplar. Of
that statute, the Weber Court wrote, “The very statutory words intended as a
spur . . . to cause ‘employers and unions to self-examine . . . their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate . . .’ [discrimination]
cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action.”237 The Court said much the same in
Johnson, where it wrote that “[a] corporation concerned with maximizing
234

See McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2008).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
236 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545–
46 (2015) (fair housing); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (employment);
Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926–27 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (lending).
Governments, which are by default regulated via the Equal Protection Clause, may also be subject to such
statutes when they are acting within the statute’s scope. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (regulating
government employers).
237 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
235
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return on investment . . . is hardly likely to adopt a[n] [affirmative action]
plan if in order to do so it must compile evidence that could be used to subject
it to a colorable Title VII suit.”238 Thus, the evidence necessary to support an
affirmative action plan “need not be such that it would support a prima facie
[discrimination] case against the employer.”239 And most recently, in Ricci,
the Court reiterated that the strong basis in evidence standard “limits . . .
discretion [to promulgate affirmative action policies] to cases in which there
is a strong basis in evidence of . . . liability, but it is not so restrictive that it
allows [institutions] to act only when there is a provable, actual violation.”240
So, the Court maintains that there is breathing room between the
evidence necessary to promulgate an affirmative action plan and that which
would support a disparate impact claim. But what, then, is the difference
between the two? And how would these differences matter when evaluating
Big Data Affirmative Action policies?
The answer, in part, is that fancy statistics alone cannot win a
discrimination suit. Even under laws that allow disparate impact proof of
discrimination, the numbers, without more, are not enough. In Wal-Mart v.
Dukes,241 the plaintiffs presented disparate impact evidence of employment
discrimination very much like the evidence that might support a Big Data
Affirmative Action plan. They assembled a regression model showing
“disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart . . . [that] c[ould] be
explained only by gender discrimination.”242
Yet the Wal-Mart Court rejected the employees’ Title VII claims.243
This was not because the Court discredited their statistical analysis.244 It was
instead because the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy another requisite element
of a disparate impact claim. They had not identified a single, particularized
“pattern or practice” or “corporate policy” that caused the disparate
outcomes.245 To succeed, a disparate impact claim brought by multiple
plaintiffs requires some narrative “glue holding the alleged reasons for all
those [allegedly discriminatory] decisions together.”246
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Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 633 (1987).
Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
240 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009).
241 546 U.S. 338 (2011).
242 Id. at 356.
243 Formally, the Court denied class certification. But it did so by looking to the merits and holding
that the class could not carry its substantive burden of identifying a single discriminatory policy or
practice. Id. at 352.
244 Id. at 356 (“Even if they are taken at face value, these studies are insufficient . . . .”).
245 Id. at 352, 355.
246 Id. at 352.
239
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Plaintiffs may carry this burden by showing, for example, that a single
“biased testing procedure” caused the identified statistical disparities.247
They may even present evidence that the relevant decision-makers, having
some discretion, all exercised that discretion to discriminate in the same
way.248 This may be shown through substantial testimony of overt and related
discriminatory acts against a large proportion of the plaintiffs.249 What is not
enough is what the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart presented: a story of many
different people discriminating at many different times, each in their own
ways.250
Here, we find a fortuitous symmetry. Title VII will not impose liability
to remedy discrimination emerging from chaotic, multifactorial processes.
But such situations are precisely where Big Data Affirmative Action would
be the most useful. When a company has a single policy driving all of its
discriminatory disparities, Big Data Affirmative Action is unnecessary: The
company can just get rid of the policy.251 On the other hand, in contexts where
innumerable actors are making innumerable, unrelated, and biased decisions,
a Big Data Affirmative Action policy could well be the only way to remedy
the resulting harm. Thus, Big Data Affirmative Action is most likely to raise
the threat of legal liability when it is least needed. And conversely, in the
many, many contexts where Big Data Affirmative Action is sorely needed,
the threat of liability is minimal.
Moreover, even in contexts where a disparate impact suit might be
viable, implementing Big Data Affirmative Action should decrease one’s net
expected legal liability. Suppose that a statistical study underpinning a
company’s Big Data Affirmative Action policy showed that it discriminated
against women by paying them 10% less than men. And suppose that the
women sued to recover for that discrimination. Suppose further that they
somehow overcame the Wal-Mart problem and won. Then, their
presumptive damages would just be the amount they were underpaid because
of their race, sex, or other protected characteristic. By hypothesis, however,

247

Id. at 353 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
Id.
249 Id. at 358.
250 Id. at 356, 358. The “policy” or “practice” requirement in disparate impact suits is likely rooted
in principles of procedural justice requiring high accuracy in adjudication at the level of individual claims.
See Salib, supra note 57, at 536.
251 Note that the employer in Ricci was unable to scrap its test precisely because it had spent so much
energy developing a test under which any racial disparity would be warranted from the perspective of
employment. That is, it was careful to craft a test that evaluated necessary job skills, such that, in the
Court’s view, the resulting Black–white divide was attributable not to the department’s discrimination,
but to broader societal inequality. See supra notes 200–204 and accompanying text. Thus, the Ricci
problem would not apply to an actual discriminatory policy.
248
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the institution’s Big Data Affirmative Action policy would already have
adjusted women’s salaries upward to counteract the 10% penalty. Thus, once
a Big Data Affirmative action policy is in place, any discrimination it
identifies is already redressed, and there is no longer a lawsuit to bring. Not
only would the plaintiffs lack damages, but without any lingering injury, they
might even lack Article III standing to sue.252
Institutions considering implementing Big Data Affirmative Action
should therefore rest easy. The evidence needed to implement the policy is
different from the evidence that would invite civil suits. Moreover, the mere
implementation of a Big Data Affirmative Action policy acts as a
prophylactic against antidiscrimination suits. The policies thus reduce, not
increase, implementing institutions’ expected legal liability.
IV. NORMATIVE OBJECTIONS
This Part explores potential normative challenges to the implementation
of Big Data Affirmative Action. Some of these are old—aired regularly
against affirmative action of all styles. For example, critics like Justice
Clarence Thomas have long argued that affirmative action can harm its
intended beneficiaries by signaling that their accomplishments are
unearned.253 Others have long argued that affirmative action is simply a kind
of “reverse” racism, and thus equally immoral to the wrong it is designed to
remedy.254 This Part argues that, whether or not these critiques carry water
against more traditional affirmative action—and they may not—they have
no force against the Big Data variety.
Other potential challenges are newer and more specific to Big Data
Affirmative Action. One is a normative cousin of the reverse racism
question: Does Big Data Affirmative Action adequately match remedies to
harms? The answer is yes, and it does so according to settled positive legal
principles. Other critiques sound in effectiveness: Can Big Data Affirmative
Action really do what it promises? And even if it can, is that enough to make
a serious difference in American racial inequality? The answer to both
questions is yes, so long as Big Data Affirmative Action is adopted widely
and implemented carefully.
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See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 333 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that affirmative action “stamps blacks and Hispanics with a badge of inferiority” (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995))); Ariane De Vogue, ‘Silent’ Justice Outspoken on
Affirmative Action, ABC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2007), https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3667079
[https://perma.cc/8J6R-RBNZ] (detailing Justice Thomas’s lament that his Yale law degree “bore the
taint of racial preference”).
254 See AMY E. ANSELL, RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE KEY CONCEPTS 136 (2013).
253
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The final challenge is somewhat deeper. An implicit premise of the Big
Data Affirmative Action proposal is that people cannot change very much.
Discriminatory attitudes, whether conscious or unconscious, are sticky, and
we do not know yet how to undo them. Big Data Affirmative Action
essentially gives up on the project of perfecting human decision-makers and
instead opts for algorithmic intervention. Humans in such a system become
moral cyborgs, reliant in the long run on mechanical enhancements to their
ethical decision-making. Should we be comfortable with this acceptance of
our own ultimate imperfectability? And if so, does the law sanction such
thinking? The answer to the former question is maybe, depending on one’s
goals and normative commitments. The answer to the latter is yes.
A. “Reverse Racism” and Signaling Effects
Perennial critics of old-fashioned affirmative action unfailingly raise
three related arguments against it. The first argument is that affirmative
action harms, instead of helps, its intended beneficiaries. Affirmative action
does this, critics like Justice Thomas argue, by inviting doubt that the
beneficiaries of affirmative action deserve their achievements. Consider a
young Black attorney who is hired at an elite white-shoe firm. If the firm
practices affirmative action, perhaps her colleagues will assume that she was
hired because of her race and think less of her intelligence. This might be a
very bad outcome for her. After all, one important reason to join such a firm
is to gain the respect and admiration of lawyerly elites.
The second traditional critique of affirmative action focuses on the
people who do not benefit from it. If an affirmative action policy benefits
members of one racial group, the argument goes, it must necessarily harm
members of the other groups.255 This argument has the most appeal in zerosum settings, potentially including elite legal hiring. If the firm has a fixed
budget for new associates, every person who is hired displaces someone else.
On the other hand, this argument has less force in non-zero-sum settings like
criminal sentencing. Lowering one defendant’s sentence does not increase
anyone else’s. However, antidiscrimination law does recognize some claims
based on unequal treatment even in non-zero-sum contexts.256
The third version of this critique takes a more abstract view. On this
account, affirmative action—even when designed to redress racism—
actually constitutes racism because it differentiates treatment on account of
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See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157,
163 (1st Cir. 2020).
256 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (holding that it does not matter for Equal
Protection purposes whether segregated schools are “equal” in quality).
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race.257 It does not matter, on this view, whether affirmative action helps or
harms historically disadvantaged groups. By implementing any race-based
preferences at all, affirmative action commits the very moral sin it purports
to cure.
Big Data Affirmative Action is not vulnerable to any of these critiques.
The response to all of them is the same: Big Data Affirmative Action policies
do not operate as unearned windfalls to members of minority groups. Instead,
they are precise correctives for discrimination that those individuals would
otherwise suffer. In this sense, Big Data Affirmative Action is best
analogized to civil damages for discrimination—not, say, a lottery open only
to members of historically disadvantaged groups.
If a brilliant Black woman is hired by a white-shoe law firm, and her
firm has a Big Data Affirmative Action hiring policy, what should her
colleagues think of her? It’s simple: they should think that she was hired
under fair conditions of nondiscrimination. Yes, the firm added some bonus
points to her application file. But so what? Those are just the points she
would otherwise have been denied because of her race. Surely, no one thinks
that the firm ought to have discriminatorily withheld points. Thus, no one
should think less of her if it gives them back.258
The same logic applies to the “more for you means less for me” critique.
It is true that, in zero-sum settings, Big Data Affirmative Action might cause
members of some groups to lose a benefit when members of another gain it.
But this, again, is objectionable only if the losers would have gotten the
benefit under nondiscriminatory decision procedures. No one is entitled to
the advantage of a decision-maker’s discrimination against their competitors.
Since Big Data Affirmative Action policies operate to carefully remove
discrimination from decisions, those who “lose” under such systems
generally have no cause to complain.259
257

See ANSELL, supra note 254, at 136.
Skeptics might further argue that Big Data Affirmative Action does not give the attorney precisely
the number of points she was denied because of her race. Rather, the adjustment represents a best
statistical guess for someone like her, around which there remains some individual variance. True. But
this means that she might just as well have gotten an adjustment that was too small as too large. Her
colleagues have no reason to suspect one rather than the other and thus no reason to assume she is any
more or less deserving of admission than they are.
259 For a more plausible version of this objection, consider a context in which two groups suffered
discriminatory harm, but the Big Data Affirmative Action remedy applied to only one of them. Then the
excluded group might have a kind of normative claim against the employer: Why should the included
group’s injury be remedied, but not theirs? It is an interesting and, to my knowledge, open question
whether this normative claim would have legal weight. Certainly, the excluded group might have a legal
claim for the first-order discrimination that they faced. But should they have a claim based on the
differential remedy? Should we penalize employers for fixing some of their mistakes, simply because
258
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Finally, there is the argument that assigning value based on race is
simply wrong, regardless of whether the value is positive or negative. Even
accepting the premise, Big Data Affirmative Action does the exact opposite.
Big Data Affirmative Action policies are predicated on evidence that
someone else—an employer, judge, doctor, etc.—has assigned (negative)
value to race. The policy then undoes that assignment by adjusting the
outcome to be race neutral. It is not morally objectionable if an intervention
to correct racial discrimination ends up being race based. That is just how
remedies work; they flow to the injured. Big Data Affirmative Action, then,
is not reverse racism at all. It is, on the contrary, a reversal of racism.
For better or worse, the same cannot be said of every other style of
affirmative action policy. Campus affirmative action, to which the reverse
racism label is often applied, is not designed as a remedy for discrimination.
Recall that the legal justification for affirmative action in admissions is that
colleges have a compelling interest in attaining diversity of thought on
campus.260 Under that framework, affirmative action does assign value on
the basis of race—membership in a racial minority group has positive
diversity value.
Conservative critics may nevertheless be wrong about campus
affirmative action. It is arguably not always wrong to assign value based on
race. Instead, whether it is wrong may depend on many factors, like the
amount of value being assigned, the reason for assigning it, and the
downstream effects of doing so. But this response is complex and perhaps
debatable. Big Data Affirmative Action, working as it does to undo racebased value assignments, is justified irrespective of that debate.
B. Individual Injuries, Average Remedies
As just argued, Big Data Affirmative Action is not reverse racism
because it supplies legitimate remedies for legitimate injuries. But how well
do the remedies match the harms? Consider, for example, a given statistical
model for measuring race-based salary discrimination that identifies a 10%
pay gap between Black and white employees at a firm. A Big Data
Affirmative Action policy based on that model would automatically adjust
Black employee salaries up by the same amount. But—one could object—
some Black employees surely suffered more discriminatory harm than that—
and some less. Big Data Affirmative Action therefore supplies only

they did not fix all of them? This is a harder question. At any rate, such considerations show that, when
institutions promulgate Big Data Affirmative Action policies, they should try to make those policies
comprehensive.
260 See supra Section III.A.1.
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“average”261 remedies that will often either over- or undercorrect individual
harm.
To begin, this factual characterization of Big Data Affirmative Action
is not quite right. Neither statistical models measuring discrimination nor the
Big Data Affirmative Action policies based on them need treat every Black
employee the same. As discussed above, in the statistical models, race can
be intersected with other features to measure intragroup variation in
discrimination.262 Thus, a Big Data Affirmative Action policy could supply
different benefits to Black women than Black men, assuming they were
treated differently by the relevant institution. Or it could vary its benefits by
both race and age. Or by both race and education. And so on.
Adding this kind of intragroup variation to Big Data Affirmative Action
policies blunts the force of the “average remedies” critique. But it does not
refute the argument entirely. No amount of statistical refinement can produce
a policy that perfectly corrects every discriminatory injury. There will always
be some amount of averaging—say, across older Hispanic women who do
engineering work.
This, however, is not a good reason to refuse to implement Big Data
Affirmative Action. The objection here sounds in error rates: any Big Data
Affirmative Action policy will compensate some people a bit too little for
their harm and some a bit too much. But without Big Data Affirmative
Action, the alternative would most often be no recovery at all. Absent
affirmative action, litigation is the likely alternative path to compensation.
And, as discussed above, the evidentiary burdens of Title VII and similar
laws render many discriminatory injuries—indeed the very ones at which
Big Data Affirmative Action is aimed—irremediable.263 Big Data
Affirmative Action thus introduces small individual errors in order to avoid
the massive and pervasive error of a uniform no-recovery rule.
This trade-off is not unique to Big Data Affirmative Action. On the
contrary, for these same reasons, averaged remedies are commonplace
everywhere in antidiscrimination law—including both individual and class
litigation. Consider a class action alleging that some employer’s policy
imposes a disparate racial or other impact. There, the employer is liable for
average, not individual, impacts on protected groups.264 Remedies, too, are
often averaged. An injunction against a challenged policy is a one-size-fitsall remedy. It benefits the majority of class members who were harmed by
Where “average” means something like “least squares regression coefficient,” as opposed to
“population mean.”
262 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
263 See supra Section III.C.
264 See Salib, supra note 57, at 535–36.
261
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the enjoined policy, but it harms those few who may have benefitted from it.
Damages in class actions, too, are usually awarded on an averaged basis. In
the presence of small but variable harms, it would be woefully inefficient to
force every single class member to stage a mini-trial to prove his or her
personal losses. Instead, class members are routinely divided into
subpopulations and awarded damages based on features like job function,
length of tenure, protected group, and the like. This practice closely mirrors
the above-described strategies for inducing intragroup variation into Big
Data Affirmative Action policies.
Even individual antidiscrimination suits involve substantial averaging.
One way to establish individual Title VII liability is for a minority plaintiff
to show that she possessed the requisite professional qualifications for a job,
that she was rejected, and that the employer continued seeking applicants
with the same professional qualifications.265 That is, she may show that, on
average, a candidate like her ought to have been hired. The employer may
rebut this showing with individualized evidence that the plaintiff was
actually a less desirable candidate than an average candidate like her.266 But
depending on the records available, such evidence may be difficult to
produce, or the factfinder may reject it as pretext.267 That is, the average may
carry the day in establishing liability. Averaging is even more important at
the damages phase. If an employee has proved she was underpaid for
discriminatory reasons, the only evidence of what she is owed is what others
like her, on average, were paid. Because she was discriminated against,
counterfactual information about what she personally would have been paid
does not exist.
Thus, all antidiscrimination law authorizes average remedies for
individual harms. To be sure, it does so in varying degrees. The magnitude
of errors from averaging in individual suits may be smaller than in class
actions. But this is often justified because the realistic alternative to class
actions is not individual suits, but rather no remedy at all—even for valid
claims. Averaging across a class thus reduces error at the relevant margin.
So too for affirmative action. The whole point of affirmative action is
to authorize voluntary, race-conscious remedies for discriminatory harms
that would otherwise go unredressed. Here again, averaging is crucial. If the
law required affirmative action policies to suss out highly granular individual
discriminatory harm—and then apply highly individual remedies—no
institution would implement them. As discussed above, under such a rule,
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the evidence required to support an affirmative action policy would also
support a lawsuit against the implementing entity. The Supreme Court has
therefore repeatedly insisted that such evidence is not required. Instead,
averaged evidence—and thus averaged affirmative action remedies—must
be allowed.
History bears this out. The affirmative action remedies that the Court
has historically approved have included minimal or no individualization.
As discussed above, Swann upheld a plan that bused all Black students to
white schools. Weber and Paradise upheld quotas that benefitted Black
craftworkers and officers without differentiating between different
magnitudes of individual discriminatory harm. Johnson authorized the hiring
of women with lower test scores than men. It did not require a complicated
process by which test scores would be individually adjusted to account for
variations in women’s discriminatory harm. These, too, are average
remedies. And blunt ones. By comparison, then, with historically approved
affirmative action plans, the averaging errors inherent in Big Data
Affirmative Action are much smaller.
C. Data Skepticism
Statistical analysis is not physics. One cannot expect to get exactly the
same result from the same experiment every time one runs it. Datasets are
imperfect. They include elements of randomness. They can be analyzed via
different techniques under different assumptions. Given all of this, would
Big Data Affirmative Action policies stand on firm empirical footing?
As argued above, the legal answer to this question is yes; Big Data
Affirmative Action’s statistical models are sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
strong basis in evidence standard. But this does not quite answer the
normative question. Should Big Data Affirmative Action be considered
empirically sound enough to be implemented as an antidiscrimination
strategy?
One can imagine two kinds of concerns here. First, some might worry
that Big Data Affirmative Action will sometimes go too far. Perhaps certain
policies, predicated on anomalous or unreplicable evidence would bestow
large and unfair benefits in zero-sum contexts. At a first cut, there is little
reason to worry about this. Certainly, some statistical models underpinning
Big Data Affirmative Action would overestimate discrimination somewhat.
The resulting policies would be modestly overgenerous. But for every goodfaith overestimation resulting from random noise, we should expect a
counteracting underestimation. Most policies will be close to correct, and,
on average, they should be very close.
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The alternative is to decline to implement Big Data Affirmative Action
at all and to thus allow pervasive discrimination to continue unchecked. Even
if one objects to errors in racialized treatment, why prefer this option? To do
so, one must think that small—and likely zero, on average—errors
overcorrecting discrimination are worse than the huge, blanket error of no
correction. There is little sense in such a view.
In fact, the second kind of concern goes one step further. Perhaps
empirical errors would not be randomly distributed, but would rather be the
result of motivated reasoning, or even fraud. Here, too, though, one can
anticipate errors on both sides of the ideal point. Maybe some overzealous
progressive institutions would rely on statistical models that were too
generous in granting affirmative action benefits. But plenty of cautious or
conservative-leaning institutions could effectively entrench even larger
opposing errors by refusing to consider Big Data Affirmative Action at all.
Moreover, when it comes to data analysis, it is not so easy to cook the
books. A recent study by Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner
examines such attempts by Trump Administration agencies.268 It finds that,
despite the agencies’ best efforts, they were largely unable to produce
credible cost–benefit analyses to justify rolling back Obama-era policies.269
Relatedly, in academia, empirical social scientists have developed
techniques like “pre-registration,” “open data,” and “open code” to guard
against improper research techniques.270 These techniques could easily be
adopted for Big Data Affirmative Action as a prophylactic against charges
of motivated reasoning.
In the end, it is always a mistake to treat data scientists as infallible
oracles. But so too would it be a mistake to dismiss their techniques. Data
analysis is a powerful tool for learning about what is actually happening in
the world. And for problems like discrimination, that makes it a powerful
tool for improving the world via well-calibrated policy. Moreover, statistical
social science can be done transparently, allowing skeptics to check
practitioners’ work for both error and malfeasance.

268 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis, 70 DUKE
L.J. 1109, 1114–36 (2021).
269 Id. at 1136 (“The preceding examples demonstrate that [cost-benefit analysis] is not as malleable
as some of its critics have contended.”).
270 Erin Standen, Open Science, Pre-Registration, and Striving for Better Research Practices, AM.
PSYCH. ASS’N (Nov. 2019), https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2019/11/better-research-practices
[https://perma.cc/W4BU-RQ2J].
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D. Weak Medicine
Suppose Big Data Affirmative Action policies could be trusted to
redress particular kinds of discrimination by particular institutions. Would
that be enough? Consider again criminal sentencing. The gross disparity in
federal criminal sentences between Black and white defendants is roughly
64%.271 But a Big Data Affirmative Action sentencing policy would control
for causes other than discrimination in the courthouse. As a result, such a
policy would probably reduce the average Black defendant’s sentence only
by around 9%.272 That leaves a disparity of more than fifty percentage points
untouched. What good is Big Data Affirmative Action if it constitutes such
weak medicine?
There are two possible responses here—one pessimistic and one
optimistic. The pessimistic response is to say that whatever its shortcomings,
Big Data Affirmative Action is the best we can do to combat persistent
discriminatory inequality. Proposals to fix discrimination by excising bias
from human decisions simply will not work.273 By contrast, affirmative
action corrects unfair outcomes directly. And Big Data Affirmative Action’s
careful, modest adjustments are the biggest ones our law allows.
The second, optimistic response is to say that Big Data Affirmative
Action need not be weak medicine at all. It is instead like real medication—
perhaps a painkiller. One capsule may be weak. But patients with an
especially bad headache can take two. Patients recovering from surgery may
be prescribed an ultra-strong dose by their doctor. What matters is not the
strength of the individual pill, but rather the availability of enough of them
to get the job done.
It is true that a Big Data Affirmative Action policy for federal criminal
sentencing would eliminate only a small fraction of the racial disparity there.
But that is because much of the total disparity is caused by inequalities
upstream of sentencing. Factors like prior arrests and education—inputs into
sentencing—are themselves deeply unequal.
Insofar as these upstream inequalities are also the result of
discrimination, they too can be the target of Big Data Affirmative Action.
The strong basis in evidence rule forbids one institution’s affirmative action
policy from fixing other institutions’ discrimination. But it places no limit
on the total number of institutions with affirmative action policies.
271

Rehavi & Starr, supra note 17, at 1321.
Id. at 1337–38.
273 See supra Section I.B. And even if such interventions did work, producing completely fairminded individual decision-makers, the per-intervention effect would be no bigger than that of Big Data
Affirmative Action. After all, Big Data Affirmative Action simply simulates fair-minded human decisionmaking.
272
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Thus, the more widely Big Data Affirmative Action policies spread, the
better. If disparities in arrests drive the disparity in sentencing, then reducing
the former will substantially reduce the latter. Upstream of that, perhaps
disparities in access to education drive disparities in arrests. Big Data
Affirmative Action policies for educational institutions can reduce inequality
there, which will in turn reduce the disparity in arrests, which will reduce the
disparity in sentencing. And so on.
Thus, Big Data Affirmative Action, as a policy design, is an ecosystem,
not a monoculture. Every individual policy, implemented at every individual
institution, affects outcomes downstream of that institution. Each
downstream institution may, in turn, implement its own Big Data
Affirmative Action plan to redress the bias they would otherwise feed into
the system. Every iteration moves the needle only a little bit toward justice,
but small improvements eventually cascade into large social effects.
This, arguably, is how affirmative action is supposed to be implemented
under our current legal rules. The strong basis in evidence standard carves
the world’s discrimination up into chunks. And it makes each chunk
remediable by one—and only one—institution: namely, the institution that
caused it. This eliminates the kind of “double recovery” that would occur if,
say, a school and an employer both had policies correcting for the school’s
discrimination.274 But on the other hand, this division is empowering, inviting
each institution to undo both the discriminatory harm it has caused and the
resulting downstream effects.
In the end, then, Big Data Affirmative Action is weak medicine only if
the patient takes too little. But with enough doses, administered carefully at
the right time and place, it can be quite strong medicine, indeed.
E. Evasion and Adaptive Decision-Making
Would individuals whose decisions would be subject to revision by
Big Data Affirmative Action accept such adjustments happily? And if not,
would individual resistance be a serious practical barrier to implementing
such policies?
Consider the three possible reactions to Big Data Affirmative Action:
enthusiasm, disgruntlement, and indifference. Indifference will likely be by
far the most common. After all, in all kinds of settings—hiring, school
admissions, commercial transactions—individuals’ decisions are already
274 I do not mean to suggest that such double recovery would necessarily be normatively
objectionable. Only that it would surely be objected to by affirmative action’s many critics. The current
legal rule thus represents a compromise view of what affirmative action should do. It treats discrimination
as a wrong to be remedied, but insists that remedies must be targeted and incremental, rather than broad
and sweeping.
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constrained by mediating bureaucratic processes. What would it matter to a
hiring manager if, after he has negotiated a new salary with an employee,
human resources—via an algorithm—adjusts that salary? Would he even
know? How different would this be from the many other constraints on
compensation—from budgets to benefits—that upper management already
imposes? Alternatively, what does a lending officer care if, contrary to her
recommendation, her employer approves a loan pursuant to a Big Data
Affirmative Action policy? How different is that from the many other
reasons—a bad home inspection, a renegotiated sale price, unexpected
financial disclosures—for overruling her?
Big Data Affirmative Action, in short, would often be implemented
where there are already numerous procedures and policies to shape and
constrain individual decisions. For most people affected, then, one more
procedure is unlikely to even register.
Moving on, progressives should be enthusiastic about Big Data
Affirmative Action. It is, after all, perhaps the only legally sound, datadriven intervention that can make a real difference in reducing
discriminatory harms. What is there to complain about?
Maybe some progressives would worry about complacency. Perhaps
they believe that, in the past, they scrupulously interrogated their own
decisions for bias and successfully excised it. Perhaps then, they worry, Big
Data Affirmative Action’s automated de-biasing would cause them to lose
that vigilance. Maybe, lacking vigilance, they would start introducing more
bias into the system than they had before—and more than the Big Data
Affirmative Action policy anticipated. Then, the policy’s benefits would be
too small, and net discriminatory harms would increase. This story seems
unlikely. As discussed above, it is extraordinarily difficult to durably de-bias
one’s own decision-making, either via mental effort or by therapeutic
practice.275 Thus, individuals who believe that, before Big Data Affirmative
Action, their own mental efforts are preventing biased decisions are probably
just wrong. To the extent that they are not wrong, Big Data Affirmative
Action’s measures of discrimination—and thus its interventions—could
and should be updated over time. If the implementation of a Big Data
Affirmative Action policy led to some complacency, then version 2.0 could
simply offset it.
This brings us, finally, to the disgruntled. Almost certainly, some
members of some professions would bristle at the thought of an algorithm
correcting their biased decisions. Such individuals might be especially
prevalent in professions where good judgment is thought to be part and
275
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parcel of the job—judges, for example. Or doctors. Even in these
professions, it should be noted, one ought to expect much enthusiasm for and
indifference to Big Data Affirmative Action. Plenty of judges are
progressives who would welcome affirmative steps to reduce inequality in,
say, criminal sentencing. And like corporate employees, judges are used to
having their decisions changed ex post via bureaucratic processes like appeal
and clemency.
What, however, would the objectors do? If they knew the amount by
which a Big Data Affirmative Action policy would adjust their decisions,
they could counteract it. They might shift their initial decisions in an equal
and opposite direction. This would be a very bad look. Suppose a judge knew
how much a Big Data Affirmative Action sentencing policy would reduce
sentences for Black defendants. To counteract those adjustments, upon
implementation of the policy, he would need to start increasing all Black
defendants’ sentences by the same amount. Such a reaction would be easy to
detect,276 raising the specter of public embarrassment and, perhaps, Equal
Protection challenges. In the end, the strategy would most likely fail.
Perhaps the judge could be subtler. Maybe he would increase sentences
for Black defendants by less than the Big Data Affirmative Action
adjustment. Or maybe he would vary his increases somewhat randomly.
These strategies, too, would be obvious if his average sentence for Black
defendants jumped after the introduction of the policy.
In any case, here, too, Big Data Affirmative Action policies could adapt
to counteract such strategic behavior. If actors in an institution adapted to
policy 1.0 by imposing harsher discriminatory penalties, then version 2.0
could simply be updated to match the new behavior. Such updates could even
be targeted to the offending individuals, relying on the empirical measures
economists already use to study interjudge variance in sentencing.277
Certainly, disgruntled objectors could then adjust their own behavior even
more to overcome the new policy. But this is an arms race that Big Data
Affirmative Action is sure to win. At some point, the offending individuals’
discriminatory behavior would become so outrageous that some combination
of law and bad press would surely shut them down.
An even better solution would be to reduce disgruntlement at the outset.
This might be accomplished by decoupling, as much as possible, initial
decisions from Big Data Affirmative Action adjustments. It is one thing for
a judge to see his preferred sentence immediately overridden. It is another if
276

Even a cursory look at the data would show a large discontinuity in sentencing around the time
of the policy’s implementation.
277 See generally, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an
Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (2014).
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the reduced sentence is recorded only later, by the Bureau of Prisons or some
other actor. Such decoupling does two things. First, it raises information
costs for bad actors. It is hard to consciously counteract a policy when you
are not sure exactly what the policy is doing. Second, such acoustic
separation would likely reduce the subjective feelings of offense that judges
and other high-status actors would experience at being overruled.
In the end, strategic adaptation of decision-making is unlikely to
threaten the effectiveness of Big Data Affirmative Action. Most people
whose decisions would be subject to such policies would carry on without
change. Some would enthusiastically welcome such policies’ benefits. And
the few objectors to Big Data Affirmative Action would have few avenues
for successful resistance.
F. Are Humans Obsolete?
Big Data Affirmative Action policies are designed to adjust otherwisedefective human decisions. But why involve humans at all? If, as argued
above, human decision-makers are deeply biased and immune to all cures,
why give them any hand in making hiring decisions, setting salaries,
approving mortgages, determining prison sentences, or anything else of
importance?
Why not instead let the very Big Data models needed to correct human
decisions simply make those decisions in the first instance? A standard
regression model of a company’s salary decisions could yield a number of
coefficients: each year of postsecondary education is worth X dollars to the
company, each point on a work skills aptitude test is worth Y, and so on.
Using these coefficients, one could simply input a given candidate’s
information into the model to calculate their salary.
To ensure that the salaries had no discriminatory bias, the statistical
model could, as all Big Data Affirmative Action models do, calculate the
effect of race. But when each individual’s salary was calculated, the
algorithm would be told that everyone was a member of the most favored
group.278 The result would mimic the Big Data Affirmative Action
interventions advocated here. Minority group members would, in effect,
receive a “bonus” in the precise amount necessary to offset the penalty they
would otherwise face on account of race.
Why not do this? Perhaps the main reason that institutions do not
abandon human decision-making entirely has to do with the so-called “error
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term” in statistical models.279 In the real world, traditional regression models
essentially never capture all of the variables affecting outcomes in human
decisions. There will always remain unexplained differences between
applicants who are identical along all of the metrics the model accounts for.
In the salary example, human decision-makers may mysteriously pay two
candidates with the same education, test scores, work history, hometown,
gender, race, etc. somewhat differently. By contrast, a totally automated
decision system based on traditional, interpretable statistical models would
treat these two candidates alike. Any two employees who looked the same,
according to the model’s finite inputs, would receive precisely the same
salary.
The question, then, is whether the inexplicable variance that comes with
human decisions is worth preserving. Perhaps it is simply random, the
product of irrelevant factors like what the decision-maker ate for breakfast.
In that case, good riddance. But suppose the error term is attributable to some
X-factor of human judgment—a first impression or a gut instinct. If the
variance captured in the error term is the result of some important
information that humans can observe—but computers cannot—it might be
worth preserving. Then, a human-centered decision procedure might be
necessary.
On the other hand, human-observed X-factors might be worse than
random. They might be discriminatory. Suppose a business wishes to base
salaries or hiring decisions in part on an applicant’s friendliness. But suppose
that the evidence suggests that judgments about such factors are strongly
biased along racial lines. What then?
One option is to throw out personality factors entirely. But there surely
are more and less friendly people—even if humans systematically
misevaluate this because of race. To wit, the same empirical studies that
showed some racial bias in personality evaluations would likely also show
that such evaluations were not solely based on race. Instead, humans’
friendliness assessments might measure something real and identifiable
person-to-person, but with a noticeable racial skew. And if some people
really are more friendly than others, that is a legitimate factor on which some
employers might wish to base employment decisions.
Another solution, then, is to use human-driven friendliness evaluations,
but eliminate their discriminatory skew using Big Data Affirmative Action.
Here, humans could take friendliness into account in making their decisions.
But the statistical model on which the Big Data Affirmative Action plan was

279 See Adam Hayes, Error Term, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/e/errorterm.asp [https://perma.cc/54PW-QR7D].
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based would not use humans’ measures of friendliness as a control.
Remember, approaches like regression analysis can estimate the effect of
race on salary, all other factors equal—where “all other factors” means “all
other modelled variables.” If the model asks, “What is the effect of race,
holding friendliness constant?,” but friendliness assessments themselves
depend significantly on race, the model will substantially underestimate the
effect of race.280 Conversely, a model that estimated race but ignored
differences in friendliness estimates would capture in the race estimation
the proportion of friendliness attributable to race. Then, the Big Data
Affirmative Action adjustment would correct the entire human racial bias,
including the proportion tied up in humans’ impressions of friendliness. The
portion of friendliness assessments not attributable to race would be shunted
to the model’s “error term” and thus left undisturbed.
Leaving friendliness out of the statistical model here sacrifices little.
Remember, the point of the analysis is to figure out the effect of race on
human decisions. The point is not to figure out the effect of friendliness.
Controlling for nonrace variables serves to disaggregate the influence of
legitimate, nonracial factors that nevertheless correlate somewhat with race.
So, it is important to regress over variables that correlate with race, but
which represent some other legitimate reason—say, job function—for a
disparity. But it seems highly unlikely that actual levels of friendliness or
collegiality—as opposed to humans’ race-inflected perceptions of them—
correlate with race at all. Thus, leaving such factors out of the statistical
model avoids underestimating the effect of race but raises less risk of
overestimating it.
It is worth noting here that the two goals at issue above—preserving
variance but eliminating discrimination—can also be achieved while
eliminating humans. To accomplish this, one could implement the two-stage
algorithmic decision processes described in Section II.A.3. First a radically
nonlinear model—like a deep neural network—would be trained to precisely
mimic human decisions. Such algorithms can reproduce the kind of variance
associated with human judgment, preserving the valuable information
encoded there.281 Indeed, doing so is their whole point.282 Then, a second Big
Data Affirmative Action model would intervene to adjust the first model’s
decision just enough to eliminate discriminatory bias.

280 See Alin, supra note 98, at 370–71 (explaining that the more interdependent variables in a model,
the smaller the measured contribution of any given variable, because the other variables “contain much
of the same information”).
281 See Salib, supra note 57, at 535–36.
282 Id.
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In the end, the choice between using humans augmented by Big Data
Affirmative Action and using nonlinear algorithms augmented by it comes
down to preference. Neither approach produces decisions that are
appreciably different from the other in terms of either accuracy or
discrimination. Institutions attracted to the efficiency of automation may
choose an all-algorithmic approach. And those that value the human touch
may keep it.
G. Less Biased Humans or Less Biased Decisions?
Big Data Affirmative Action operates under a kind of fatalism. The core
idea is that humans, despite their best efforts, simply cannot or will not stop
discriminating. Thus, the best we can do for now is to let them keep
discriminating and enlist algorithms to fix their bad decisions on the back
end. Is this attitude a betrayal of basic antidiscrimination principles? And
does the law allow it?
Connecticut v. Teal283 suggests, at first blush, that this approach is
disfavored. There, an employer used an exam as the first step in its promotion
process; a passing score was the minimum qualification for further
consideration.284 The test had a disparate impact. The passage rate was 80%
for white employees and 54% for Black ones.285 The employer then made up
for this disparity by treating Black employees better than white ones at the
later steps in the promotion process—a putative “affirmative-action
program.”286 As a result, a greater proportion of Black employees than white
employees were ultimately promoted. Yet the Supreme Court held that this
“bottom line” result was no defense, and the Black employees could state a
Title VII claim.287
There is, however, a crucial difference between Big Data Affirmative
Action and the approach that the Teal Court rejected. Namely, the employer
in Teal sought to remedy the harm its discriminatory test did to certain Black
employees by helping different Black employees. Recall that a passing score
on the test was the first, bare-minimum requirement to advance in the
promotion process. Yet the employer’s affirmative action policy applied
only at the later stages. The policy’s favorable treatment therefore did no
good for the Black employees who were weeded out at the testing phase.
Seen this way, the Court’s decision seems eminently sensible. As it
wrote, “It is clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license
283
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to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely
because he favorably treats other members of the employees’ group.”288 Of
course the Black employees who suffered discriminatory harm and got no
remedy had cognizable claims.
With this framing in mind, Teal becomes compatible with Big Data
Affirmative Action. Such policies would not justify discrimination against
some by bestowing special benefits on others. Rather, the benefits—ex post
adjustments to human decisions—would accrue to the very same people who
stood to suffer discrimination. Big Data Affirmative Action is not aimed only
at the bottom-line goal of equality of representation, though it could achieve
that if broadly deployed. Instead, Big Data Affirmative Action functions also
at the level of individuals. By undoing the effect of discrimination for the
individuals who suffered it, Big Data Affirmative Action conforms precisely
to the Supreme Court’s vision of antidiscrimination policy. It promotes not
just equality of outcomes, but “equality of opportunity and the elimination
of discriminatory barriers.”289
This answers the legal question. But what about the normative one?
Here, the most satisfying response is to say that of course it would be best to
eliminate discriminatory harms by eliminating discriminatory attitudes.
However, we as of yet lack the tools to directly and permanently change
human hearts and minds. In the meantime, discrimination persists, and
people suffer. Surely, then, it is better to relieve that suffering via Big Data
Affirmative Action—while continuing to research the psychology of
discrimination—than to do nothing at all.
CONCLUSION
Racial—and other—discrimination remains one of the most persistent
and pernicious problems in American life. It has deep roots, reaching back
well before the nation’s founding. And despite enormous legal progress in
recognizing the rights of racial minorities, women, religious minorities,
and others, discriminatory inequality continues to abound. Solutions are hard
to come by. Well-intentioned interventions designed to improve human
thinking and reduce biased decisions, unfortunately, produce scant
improvements. And old-fashioned affirmative action policies are routinely
invalidated as illegal. Big Data Affirmative Action offers a solution. It works
directly at the locus of unfair disparities, eliminating them and producing
nondiscriminatory results. And because of its empirical precision, Big Data
Affirmative Action can satisfy the legal requirements that have lately
288
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bedeviled less-sophisticated policies. Deployed carefully and broadly, then,
Big Data Affirmative Action policies would gain traction on the most
intractable of problems. In doing so, they would provide relief for the
millions of Americans who suffer from pervasive, unfair, and discriminatory
decisions affecting nearly every aspect of everyday life.
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